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CHAPTER

I:

THE TENSION BETWEEN THE EFFORT TO DISCOVER THE

TRUTH AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY

"Democracy means that if the doorbell rings in the

early hours, it is likely to be the milkman." 1

The different cultural and comparative approaches of
two important legal systems have repercussions on criminal

justice. Under the American approach,

freedom of the

individual is a paramount ideal. Distrust of any kind of
abuse of power is one of the main feature of the American
legal system. The French take a contrary approach. Freedom
is achieved through the State under French law.

of these differences,

process, e.g.,

As a result

in the first stage of the criminal

the relation between police and suspects,

there seems to be better protection of the individuals'

rights in the United States than in France.
This paper will examine the protection of individuals'
rights,

including the rights of privacy 2 and of locomotion

during the investigatory stage in American and French
criminal procedure. It will do so by focusing on searches
and seizures. However, this not a reform oriented work. Even
1

Yackle, the Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals
Iowa L. Rev. 609 (1983) (Quoting Winston Churchill).
2
By right of privacy, I mean the right to be protected in one's
property and one's person against arbitrary intrusions.
68

2

though the two systems are different, this paper will not
attempt to say that one system is superior. Rather, a major
target will be the tracing of the police investigatory

powers through searches and seizures, and how that impacts
on individuals' rights. A conclusion will be offered that

the investigatory function threatens these rights both in
the United States and in France.

I.

A closer analysis of the American criminal procedure

through a comparative study

A.

American suspects more protected?

The American law treats a suspect as a criminal

defendant when the state has initiated adversary judicial

proceedings against him, whereas the French criminal

procedure requires a certain quantum of proof to consider
the suspect as a defendant. Most of the scholars 3 analyzing

the French criminal system consider that the citizens'

rights during the police investigation stage are better

protected in the United States than in France. According to
their view,

the French police seem to have greater powers to

3

Edward A. Tomlinson, Justice issues in the United States, West
Germany, England, and France: Non adversarial Justice The French
Experience, 42 Md L. Rev. 131 (1983) [hereinafter Tomlinson, The
French Experience]; Jack Norton, Truth and Individual Rights: A
Comparison of United States and French Pre-trial Procedure, 2 Am.
Crim. L.Q. 159 (1964); Cynthia Vroom, La liberte individuelle au stade
de 1 enguete de police en France et aux Etats Unis, Revue de Sciences
Criminelles et de Droit Compare [Rev. sc crim.
487-507 (1988).
:

'

.

]

,

3

search and to seize evidence of criminal activity or persons
than American law enforcers. As a matter of fact,

the French

criminal procedure ignores different American concepts

protecting individuals' rights such as probable cause or the
exclusionary rule. In meanwhile, American practice of law
enforcement shows that police can exercise most of the
French police powers because the safeguards against police
intrusions have been redefined more narrowly under the
actual U.S. Supreme Court. The result is that in both
countries, police have broad investigatory powers. 4
It is also admitted that American criminal procedure

focuses on the protection of the innocent individual

whereas the inquiry regularity is the main preoccupation
under the French Law.

5

However, Article Sixty-six of the

actual French Constitution of

4

October,

1958, makes the

Judiciary, e.g., civil and criminal courts, guardian of

individual liberty.

6

Therefore, either an interference into

individual liberty is authorized by the Judicial Authority
or the latter controls the regularity of such a decision.
In other words,

an intervention of the Judiciary remains

necessary when a proceeding or a statute encroaches on
4

Rev.

539
5
6

Richard
(1990)

S.

Frase,

Comparative Criminal Justice,

78

Cal

.

L.

.

See Tomlinson, The French Experience,
See Fr. Const, art. 66:

supra note

3.

No one may be arbitrarily detained.
The Judicial Authority, guardian of individual liberty, shall
enforce this principle under the conditions stipulated by
legislation.

i

.

"

4

individual liberty. We shall see that a special Court called
the Constitutional Council, may invalidate a law encroaching

on individuals' rights. The principle of separation of

powers, heritage of Montesquieu, does not permit the

ordinary courts to pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute.

7

On the contrary,

this judicial review has been

admitted in the United States since 1803 in the landmark
case Marbury v. Madison.

8

The French Constitutional Council

can check the conformity of a bill with constitutional

materials called the "bloc of constitutionality.

9

This

movement of "constitutionalization" of criminal law offers

new guarantees against government intrusions.

10

Moreover,

there are international protections, particularly European
safeguards, against states' misconduct that are enforced

before European courts.

7
It must be emphasized that the French administrative courts (a
specific system of courts dominated at the top by the Council of
State) can check the Executive activities by annulling or reforming a
decision in contrast with the other courts. The latter are not allowed
to control Executive activity under the principle of the separation
between judicial and administrative authorities.
8
5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9 Those
constitutional materials encompass the Constitution
itself and its Preamble, the Fundamental Principles recognized by the
Laws of the Republic, the principles most vital in our time, e.g.,
right to strike, and the principles of constitutional values.
10 V. L. Favoreu, La constitutionnalisation
du droit penal et de
la procedure penal e
Vers un droit c ons t tut ionnel penal, in Melanges
Vitu, Cujas (1989)
.

B.

Two "opposite" criminal justice systems

It is traditional to oppose the French inquisitorial

procedure to the accusatorial or adversary American one. The
French criminal system must not be confused with the

barbarian proceedings of the Inquisition period. In the

United States as well as in France, each criminal system
encompasses a mixture of both proceedings. As concerning to
the gathering of evidence,

the American judge does not

participate in the discovery of the truth. On the contrary,
the French investigating judge {juge d instruction who is
'

appointed by a decret of the President of the Republic)
operating in the framework of an instruction can conduct the

investigation himself.

11

He also performs the functions of a

judge by issuing orders which can be appealed before the

indictment division

(

chambre d' accusation)

.

The juge

d' instruction is independent from the prosecution,

indictment division and the parties.

1.

the

12

Decentralization of the American police

In the United States,

a wide variety of officials

perform the police function such as governmental officers,
11

Another difference between both systems concerns the criminal
trial itself. In France, the presiding trial judge takes a more active
role than his American counterpart.
12 See Christian Dadomo
& Susan Farran, The French Legal System
(1993)

.

.

6

authorities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, state
policemen, and county and city police officers. Those forces
are created by various levels of government and the staff is

locally recruited. There are no general principles for

organizing policing structures. The police and prosecutorial
functions are separated. Thus, police are independent of the
local prosecutor and responsible before the local executive

branch. The supervision of police is exercised principally

by elected persons.

13

Two views of criminal procedure have been described,
the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model.

14

The

former relies on the repression of criminal conduct. It is

grounded on efficiency, administrative and expeditious
procedures. Under this approach, police misconduct is

deterred through discipline sanctions and civil tort
remedies. On the contrary,

the Due Process Model is more

concerned with equality and fairness in criminal procedure.
It appears to be an adversary and judicial model.

Thus,

evidence illegally searched and seized will be excluded and
the prosecution dismisses. Many commentators have referred
to these models.

However,

it has been argued that these two

approaches were too general and too simplified.

15

13 See Eric H. Monkkonen,
Crime and Justice in American History,
Policing and Crime control § 5 (1992).
14 See Herbert
L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process,
118 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1-68 (1964).
15 See Damaska, Evidentiary
Barriers to Conviction and Two
Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U.Pa. L. Rev. 506 (1973) (especially

pp.

575-76)

7

Nevertheless, they permit one to better understand the
actual trend of the actual U.S. Supreme Court aimed at

enforcing law.

2.

Integration of the French police with the prosecution
function

The National Police depend on the Minister of the

Interior whereas the Gendarmes are under the authority of
the Minister of the Defense. The police attached to a

certain tribunal are under the public prosecutor's
supervision, his control and his evaluation.

16

The Criminal

Procedure Code compels the police to inform the prosecutor
"without delay" when the commission of an offense is known

by them and "immediately" for a flagrant offense.

17

Judicial police and administrative police must be

distinguished under French law. The former investigate
offenses and apprehend criminals within a repressive
mission. The latter protect public, security, health and

tranquillity under a preventive mission. This separation of
functions is fundamental because the rules applicable
change. The administrative law controls the administrative

police's missions, whereas the repressive mission relies on
16

Code de procedure penal

17

C.

Pr.

Pen.

arts.

[C. Pr
Pen.] art. 41 al 2 (Fr.).
54 (Fr.). The notion of flagrancy will
It is a crime or a misdemeanor which is in
.

19,

be studied in chapter II.
the process of being committed, or which has just been committed

according to art. 53 of

C.

Pr

.

Pen.

(Fr.).

.

8

criminal law principles such as the principle of legality.

18

The criterion to draw the distinction relies on the purpose

either to prevent offenses or

of the police's action,

e.g.,

to apprehend offenders.

It must be stressed that the same

personnel may act under both missions. The broad

investigatory powers provided by the Criminal Procedure
Code,

such as investigatory detentions, are reserved to the

judicial police's missions. The police used pretextual stop
to control identity of demonstrators and detained them to

verify their identity. 19 Their purpose was to prevent public
disorder before demonstrations. Neither offense had been

committed and nor of the individuals was suspected. Such a

detention was similar to an administrative decision of
confinement without any legal grounds. The Cour de
cassation 20 censured the lower court reasoning.

21

However,

it

held that the police officers had faced a flagrancy

18

Moreover, the judicial courts are competent to any issue
arising in a repressive mission. On the contrary, a claim of damages
for example occurring in an operation of administrative police will be
brought before the administrative courts.
19 Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973 (Friedel case), Cass. crim.
1973
Bulletin Criminel [Bull. Crim.], No 7 1973 Recueil Dalloz,
Jurisprudence [D. Jur
541 note Roujou de Boubee (Fr.
The French
identification proceedings as well as the longer detention up to 24
hours will be examined in chapter III. The police officers are allowed
to detain a person up to four hours if she cannot identify herself or
refuse to do so. They can also detain a suspect of a criminal offense
up to 24 hours.
20 The Cour de cassation is the highest court for civil and
criminal law matters. It encompasses five civil division and one
criminal division.
21 The lower court justified its refusal to prosecute the
government for arbitrary detention by relying on the administrative
police power to temporally detain someone in accordance with common
practice
,

.

.

]

;

)

.

.

9

situation because of the suspicious identity card. This
latter could lead the authorities to presume the commission
of offenses and therefore,

to authorize a detention up to

twenty-four hours. The suspicious identity card transformed
an administrative mission at its inception to a judicial
one. Therefore,

it has been argued that suspicious behaviors

can provide a sufficient basis for flagrancy inquiries.

22

There is also a relevant hierarchy among the police
officers. Officers of the judicial police are distinguished

from agents of the judicial police. The broader

investigative powers are reserved to the former. This

principle has been reaffirmed by the Cour de cassation by
reversing a confiscation of radar detector seized by agents,
not officers, of the judicial police. 23 In meanwhile,

the

agents may exercise the same large investigatory powers

under the officers' supervision. Nonetheless, operations
that are not directly supervised are routinely approved by

officers of judicial police.
The judicial police activities are exercised in three

different settings, the flagrancy inquiry, the preliminary
inquiry and the inquiry under rogatories commissions. The
first one occurs when offenses are in progress or have just

been committed. Similarly, when the offense is committed
22 See Judgment of Nov.
8, 1979, Cass. crim.
1980 JurisClasseur Periodigue, Jurisprudence [J.C.P. II] 19337 note Jean Davia
,

(Fr.)

.

23

253.

(Fr.

Judgment of Jun. 17, 1987, Cass, crim., 1987 Bull. Crim., No
)

.

10

very near in time to the apprehension of a suspect pursued
by public clamor or found in possession of evidence of the
criminal activity, there is flagrancy.

24

It is a coercive

inquiry reserved only to crimes and delits punished at least
by two months of imprisonment.

25

The preliminary inquiry is

opened on police officers initiative or on instruction from
the prosecutor for any offense

contravention)

(crime,

delit and

It is the most widespread and usually

.

opposed to the first one because of its non coercive
feature,

even though the individuals may be summoned or

detained under their consent. 26 Therefore, most of the
investigation acts, searches and seizures, can be executed
by agents of the judicial police except the detention up to

twenty-four hours. Finally, the formal judicial

investigatory can be directed by the examining judge (juge
d' instruction) himself

when he has opened an instruction

either under the request of the prosecutor {requisitoire
introductif) or under the victim's complaint

constitution de partie civile)

.

(plainte avec

The scope of his

investigation depends on the matters set out in the

requisitoire introductif but it may be extended by the
examining judge. However, he will generally delegate this
24

See C. Pr Pen. art. 53 which defines the flagrancy offenses.
Similarly, offenses taking place in a house where the chief requires
the authorities to record them are assimilated to flagrancy by the
Code.
25 The French Criminal Code classifies the offenses in three
categories: contraventions ('minor or petty offenses) divided into five
classes, delits (major offenses) and crimes (serious crimes)
26 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 75 (Fr.).
.

11

task to the judicial police officers through rogatories

commission (commissions rogatoires) because of lack of time
and material means. From now on, the police are under the

examining magistrate's control once an instruction is
opened. Where there are weighty and collaborative evidence

(indices graves et concordants)
(mise en examen)

.

,

the suspect is scrutinized

Then, he may fully use his defense rights

such as legal assistance.
In both justice systems,

French and American, the

investigatory function impacts heavily on individual rights
and liberties.

II.

A difficult balance between discovery of the truth and
individuals' rights

A.

The American Constitutional guarantees

1.

Protection against arbitrary intrusions

The U.S. Constitution is the main source of protection.

Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that

encompasses the first ten Amendments, are procedural and
impose safeguards on personal dignity and privacy. The

applicability of the Federal Bill of Rights,

(approved by

Congress in 1789 and ratified by the states in 1791)
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment

into

(ratified in July

12

21,

1868) was one of the main constitutional issues in the

beginning of this century. The text was intended first to
apply only to federal criminal defendants. The first step
was to incorporate selectively certain provisions of the
Bill of rights into the states through the Due Process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then,

fundamental

fairness was admitted as a general principle in a proceeding

against an individual. Thus, even though none specific

provisions of the Bill of Rights are violated, the Due
Process of Law is violated when the state does not act with
fairness against an individual. 27 The Due Process clause is

grounded on the Fifth Amendment pertaining the federal
government and upon the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution protecting persons from state actions. The
procedural feature of the clause guarantees fair procedures.
The substantive aspect protects a person's property from

unfair governmental interferences or taking.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution deals

with searches and seizures and provides:

27 The notion of Due Process of Law was explained
in Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58
S.Ct. 149, 832 L.Ed. 288 (1937). See Black's Law Dictionary 500 (6th
ed. 1991). In the Powell case, the Court emphasized the necessity to
inquire "whether the defendants were in substance denied the right of
counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." See 287 U.S. 45, 51. The freedom
of speech and of the press are also protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316, (1926), the Court stated that the due process of law
encompasses the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."

13

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This right is recognized by the states and federal

constitutions. The interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
has raised difficulties because of the absence of an

explicit warrant requirement for searches and seizures.
For some scholars,

28

the core of this constitutional provision

relies on the reasonableness standard. Therefore, the

warrant as well as the probable cause requirements are
mislead. 29 The intent of the framers has been construed to

prohibit only unreasonable searches and seizures.

30

Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court's majority view has

stated that searches and seizures require a presumptive

warrant as well as a probable cause for warrantless
intrusion to be reasonable. 31
It might be argued that these constitutional guarantees

restrict the gathering of evidence against individuals.

28

William D. Anderson, Jr., Overview of the Fourth Amendment,
L.J. 597 (1994). The author claims that " [I] nterpreted
literally, the Amendment does not require warrants for searches and
seizures, nor does it require that searches and seizures be supported
82 Geo.

by probable cause."
29 Akil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
Harv.
L.

Rev.
30

757 (1994)
See Harris v. United States,
.

331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) ("[I]t
is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the

constitutional interdiction.").
31 See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).

(1967); Carroll

"

14

However, a democratic and free society needs some barriers
to government's action.

2.

State interest in effective law enforcement

Every criminal system is faced with the need of an

efficient justice to fight crime without being arbitrary. It
has been stressed that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid

any search and seizure but only unreasonable intrusions in
one's privacy. Thus,

the Fourth Amendment does not "den[y]

law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which

reasonable men draw from evidence ... [but it] requir[es] that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached

magistrate.

32

The Constitutional provision protects individuals only

against government action. Private searches such as those

conducted by private company guards or neighborhood security
patrols are outside the field of the constitutional
guarantees. Nevertheless, searches by private persons but

considered as public function, e.g., exclusively reserved to
the government, must meet the Fourth Amendment

requirements.

33

Similarly, a sufficient connection between

the private action and the government makes the search

"public." Thus,
32

if a statute makes intrusions in one's

See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
See Flagg Bros v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
33

..

s

.

15

privacy compulsory or encourages them strongly, we face
government action.

34

However,

a

these exceptions are construed

narrowly. Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment provisions apply

only to the "national community" and not to the nonresident
aliens

B.

35

The French Legislative protections

According to the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights,
the State guarantees and protects an individual

36

'

fundamental rights. Therefore, one of the police functions,
as representatives of the State,

is to enforce this

protection. A conflict may arise between the means used by
law enforcers and their guardian's role of individual

rights

37

34 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963)
(segregation of a private restaurant is government action because it
is compelled by state law); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,

489 U.S.
35

1056,

602,

615

(1989)

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez

108 L.Ed. 2d 222

,

494 U.S.

259,

110 S.Ct.

(1990).

36

The French Constitution incorporates by reference the
individual rights recognized in the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution
and in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. See
Fr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1958).
37 Etienne Pi card, La
police et le secret des donnees d'ordre
personnel en droit francais, Rev. sc crim. 275 (1993) (Arts. 2, 12 of
the declaration of 1789) (Fr.).
.

.

.

16
1.

Principle of legality

The state must proceed according to the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Code recently reformed by the Act of

August 24,

1993.

This general principle of law stated in

38

the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 39 was a reaction

against the arbitrary criminal proceedings during Ancien

Regime (from the XII century till 1789)
revolutionaries,

.

With the

the loi becomes the only source of criminal

law as well as criminal procedure.

It means that the citizen

cannot be punished for a criminal offense that is not

codified by a law ruled by Legislature. This fundamental

principle has been re-shaped in the actual Constitution of
1958. Thus,

the text distinguishes the areas falling in the

legislative field and those belonging to the Executive under
its articles Thirty-four and Thirty-seven. The legislative

power determines the crimes and misdemeanors (crimes et
delits)

,

as well as the penalties imposed.

40

The

38 Act of Aug. 24, 1993 modifying the Act of Jan. 4, 1993
reforming the criminal procedure
No. 93-1013, Journal Officiel
[J.O.] Aug. 25, 1993; Bernard Bouloc, Chronique legislative, Rev. sc
,

crim.

590

(1994)

(Fr.

)

39

See arts. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and particularly art. 8 providing
that "[T]he law may only establish those penalties that are strictly
and clearly necessary and no one may be punished except under a law
established and promulgated prior to the wrongful act (delits)." The
phase " crimes et delits" was construed before 1958 as encompassing all
the offenses.
40
Fr. Const, art. 34:
-

All laws shall be passed by Parliament.
Laws shall establish the regulations concerning:
omitted]

[part

,

.

,

17

construction of Article Thirty-four raised difficulties
because the contraventions

,

the third type of offense, does

not appear in its content. Therefore,

the executive branch

may be competent to create and to punish the petty offenses
by imprisonment. Such a power is in contradiction with the

principle of legality found in the former Article Four of
the Penal Code stating that none offense committed prior the
loi providing penalties,

could be punished.

41

This issue

divided the Constitutional Council, the Council of State and
the Cour de cassation.* 2 Today,

the debate seems over

because the new Penal Code prohibits imprisonment penalties
for the contraventions. 43 In other words,

the Executive

remains competent to determine and sanction the petty

offenses except for the imprisonment penalties. 44

- determination of crimes and misdemeanors
(crimes et delits)
as well as the penalties imposed therefor; criminal procedure;
amnesty; the creation of new juridical systems and the status
of magistrates, [part omitted]

41

The Penal Code has also been reformed by the Act of December
1992 modified by the Act of July 19, 1993. The new Code is
applicable since March 1, 1994.
42 The Council of State refused to encompass the petty offenses
in the legislative field. See Judgment of Feb. 12, 1960 (Societe Eky)
Conseil d'Etat, 1960 J.C.P. II 11169 bis note Vedel (Fr.). The
Constitutional Council held that the executive branch cannot impose
imprisonment as a contravention penalty. See Decision of Nov. 28,
1973, Conseil Constitutionnel [Con. const.] (Fr.). The Cour de
cassation adopted the same holding as the highest administrative court
in the Schiavon case. See Judgment of Feb. 26, 1974. Cass. crim.
1974
Gazette du Palais [G.P.] 1, 235 (Fr.). It accepted the competence of
the Executive to rule imprisonment penalties for the petty offenses.
43 See C. Pen. art. 131-12 (Fr.) stating the penalties
available
for the contraventions: fine and deprivation of certain rights such as
the suspension of one's driver's license or the seizure of the
instrument of the offense.
44 Moreover, the French Constitution in its article
11, 16, 38,
92 allows the Legislature to delegate its powers to the Executive in
16,

,

.

Surprisingly, body searches as well as vehicles

searches are not regulated under the Criminal Procedure
Code. The rules applicable to the former are found in an

executive act organizing the services of gendarmerie.* 5
However, body searches,

in contrast to vehicles searches,

have been assimilated by the French courts to the

perquisitions* 6 which are regulated in the Criminal

Procedure Code. 47 Fairness in the gathering of proof

prevents the acquisition of evidence in violation of the
sanctity of the domicile protected in Article 226-4 of the

new Penal Code. However, this article also foresees the
intrusion in one's domicile that would be authorized by the
law.

The fair treatment general principle of law exists when
the "rights of defense" emanating from the Code's frame have

not yet attached,

e.g.,

during a police inquiry.

Nonetheless, one of the aim of the recent criminal procedure

reform was to improve the suspect's protection during this
critical stage. 48

The "rights of defense" have not been

certain circumstances. Through these delegations, the criminal
procedure has been reformed.
45 Act of May 20, 1903 modified by an act of August
22, 1958.
The provision of this statute allows gendarmes to conduct body search
of any individual apprehending in a flagrancy situation (art. 307).
Similarly, prior to the detention of a person within the garde a vue
body searches are lawful Finally a drunk person found in a public
place can be frisked before being retained (art. 308).
46 It is a search of incriminating evidence
conducted in an
enclosed place such as one's domicile.
47 See Judgment of Jan.
22, 1953, Cass. crim.
1953
D. Jur
.

,

II 7456 (Fr.)..
48 From now on, an individual detained
during an investigation,
within the frame of the garde a vue (police custody)
has a right to

533;

1953 J.C.P.

,
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defined precisely concerning their source and scope. 49 They
imply a contradictory examination, not only of the files

gathered in the dossier during an instruction, but also of
the debates under the jurisprudence of the Cour de

cassation. Moreover,

those rights permit some form of

judicial review of an administrative decision taking the
form of a sanction against an individual.

50

The secret of

conversations between a counsel and his client falls into
the "rights of defense." They are not invoked in the

Constitution itself. Nevertheless, they have been elevated
as constitutional rights by the Constitutional Council.

2.

51

Facultative preliminary check: The constitutional control

Since 1958, the Constitutional Council may confront
bills with the Constitution to validate or invalidate them
counsel arising after a certain period of detention. We will examine
closely this important police seizure power in chapter III.
49 In the Tery case, the Council of State held that the "rights
of Defense" encompass the right to timely notice, the right to demand
that all members of the tribunal be present at all times and their
names be affixed to the judgment, the right to be heard after the
presentation of the charges and before the deliberation of the
tribunal and finally, the right to require that every judgment
contains grounds. See Judgment of June 20, 1913 (Tery case), Conseil
d'Etat, in Long Weil, & Braibant, Les Grands Arrets de la
Jurisprudence Administrative (Fr.).
50 Judgment of Feb. 7, 1947,
(d'Ailleres case) Conseil d'Etat,
1947 Dalloz Periodique, Doctrine [D.P. Doc] 62 (Fr.).
51 Decision of Dec. 2, 1976, Con. const., Fr
Dec. 7, 1976 J.O.
7052; Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, (decision "Security and Liberty.")
Con. const., Fr
Jan. 22, 1981 J.O. 308 (Fr.). In the latter
decision, the provision of the law allowing the presiding judge to
prevent a lawyer guilty of causing a disturbance access to the court
room violated the constitutional principle of the rights of the
defense. Jan. 22, 1981 J.O. at 311.
.

.

,

,

.
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between the times of their enactment and promulgation.
However,

it is not a mandatory control.

officials,

Different political

the President of the Republic,

the Prime

Minister, each President of the Houses (Chamber of Deputies

and Senate)

,

or sixty deputies or senators since 1974,

refer to the Constitutional Council bills for review.
the contrary,

52

can

On

the citizens do not have access to

constitutional justice. The Constitution's revision of

November 1993 did not expand the right to challenge a bill
for review. The Constitutional Council will check the

conformity of the bill with the materials encompassed in the
"bloc of constitutionality." 53
In its historical decision of July 16,

1971,

54

the

French Constitutional Council, relying on the Preamble of
the Constitution,

elevated freedom to the status of a

constitutional right. For the first time, a statute

encroaching on individual freedom (freedom of association)
was nullified. The Constitutional Council held that the

judiciary authority must guarantee the enforcement of the

52

The members' term lasts nine years, and one-third of the
members is replaced every three years. The members are appointed in
rotation by the President of the Republic, by the Chairman of the
National Assembly, and by the President of the Senate.
53 See supra note 9
54 Decision of
July 16, 1971, Con. const. 1971 Juris-Classeur
Periodique, Doctrine [J.C.P. I.] 16832; 1971 Actualite Juridique de
Droit Administratif [A.J.D.A.] 537 note Rivero (Fr.). The bill
provided that the legal capacity of a registered association would
depend on a preliminary check made by the Judicial authority. Before
this bill, an association could be created freely. Therefore, the
constitutional court seized by the President of Senate struck down the
bill because it violated a constitutional liberty.

.

i

;

.
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constitutional rules. This judicial review on civil
liberties grounds has often been compared to the leading
case Marbury v. Madison.

55

Since 1971, the Council's

function is no more limited to that "of preserving the

constitutional balance struck in 1958 by assuring that
Parliament respects the limits imposed on its legislative

competence vis-a-vis the Government." 56 This landmark

decision gave constitutional value to the texts incorporated
in the Preamble of the Constitution 57 that proclaim

individual liberty, composed of personal security and
privacy, as the inalienable right of man. From now on,

the

need to protect the liberty against the law is enforced by
the Constitutional Council.

58

The effectiveness of such a

control has been recently reaffirmed. The Constitutional

Council struck down a bill --related to the need to prevent

violence during demonstrations-- giving the high ranking
civil servants (les prefets)

the power to order vehicles'

searches to seize any object that might be used as weapons

during demonstrations. The Constitutional Council, relying
55

See supra note 8. However, it has been stressed that
constitutional control existed prior to the 1971 decision. See
Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in
France: The Conseil c ons t tut ionnel since 1971, 63 Tul L. Rev. 2 65,
274 (1988) [hereinafter Vroom, The Conseil Constitutionnel]
56 Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional
Liberties in France, 20 Am. J. Comp. L 431, 436-37 (1972) (the author
refers to the separation of competencies between the Executive and the
Legislature as provided by articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution)
Haimbaugh, Was it France' s Marbury v. Madison? 35 Ohio St. L.J. 910
.

.

,

(1974)

.

57

58

131

See supra note 36.
See J. Rivero, Le Conseil Constitutionnel,

(1984)

(Fr.

)

et Les Libertes,

.
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on Article Sixty-six of the Constitution,

held that the

Judicial Authority must authorize such an intrusion because
of its guardian role.

59

3.

Higher supervision of individual's privacy

a.

The European Convention

The European Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November

4,

1950, was

ratified by the French government in 1974 and in 1981 for
its Article Twenty-five providing a judicial remedy for

individuals before the European institutions.

60

Article

Eight deals with individual privacy and states that
1.
Everyone has the
private and family

right
life,

to

his

respect for his
home and his

correspondence
2.
There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security,
public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime,
for
the
protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

59

See Decision of January 18, 1995, Con. const., Fr.
1995
Legislation [D.L.] 92 (Fr.).
60 [European] Convention for the protection of Human rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U. N. T. S. 222, entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953; amended by Protocol No. 3, entered into force
Sept. 21, 1970, and Protocol No. 5, entered into force Dec. 21, 1971.
The French Act No. 73-1227 of Dec. 31, 1973 allowed the ratification.
,

Dalloz,

See Jan.

3,

1974 J.O.

67.

.

.
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Article Five of the Convention interests us as well because
it protects individual liberty and security of persons

against arbitrary seizures and detentions.

61

The European

Court of Human Rights as well as the European Commission

interpret broadly the provisions of the Convention,

particularly its Article Eight. The jurisprudence of the
European Courts has argued the necessity of a flexible

construction of the Convention. The agreement is part of
French law and therefore, directly applicable before French
courts.

62

Furthermore, the individuals may bring a petition

before the European institutions.

b.

The effectiveness of the Convention

Individuals can bring a petition before the Commission
of Human rights which is composed of twenty-eight members

sitting in sessions in Strasbourg (art. 25).

63

The remedy is

available if the applicants establish to be victims of a

breach of the Convention as well as an exhaustion of the

61

id.

62

See Fr Const, art. 55 making ratified treaties overriding
Acts of Parliament.
63 See Tom Wart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions
The Case Law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Human
Rights Committee, § 2.2 (1994). The members of the Commission are
elected by the Committee of Ministers for a period of six years. Eight
sessions a year are usually held. Id. at § 2.2.1. The contracting
states can also denunciate to the Commission the violations of the
Convention by another contracting State or bring an action directly
before the European Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, they rarely
do so
.
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domestic remedies.

64

First,

the Commission examines the

admissibility of the petition under a contradictory
examination. A lawyer of the Secretariat of the Commission

prepares the decision on this issue in consultation with the
Rapporteur, member of the Commission to whom the case has

been referred. Once the application is held admissible by
the Commission's majority vote,

the Commission tries to

settle an agreement out of the Court. If it fails, a report

discloses the facts and the opinion as regard to the

Convention's violation by the State party. This report is
sent to the Committee of Ministers and to the State party.

The Commission's report does not bind the Court of Human
Rights. Then,

the Plenary Commission decides to bring the

case before submitting it to the Court in a period of three

months from the date of the report's transmission to the

Committee of Ministers. Full jurisdiction is given to the
Court that may redecide the admissibility of the petition.
The Court affords just satisfaction to the injured party
(art.

50)

.

A recent agreement provides the replacement of

the above procedure by the establishment of a permanent and
full time European Court of Human rights.

65

64 In practice, the applicants will produce evidence of an
exhaustion of local remedies when the State party raises the objection
of non-exhaustion. Once the State party has shown existence of
effective and sufficient domestic remedies, the applicants may contest
the state's claim with contrary evidence.
65 See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for
the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Explanatory Report, Treaties
and Reports, Council of Europe, 1994. Some preparatory documents have
been published in 14 HRLJ (1993), pp. 31-49.

"
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A state intrusion in one's privacy may be allowed under
certain conditions. Thus, the state interference must be

grounded on a clear and complete law providing proportionate
measures. Recently, the French provisions of the Customs

Code dealing with searches and seizures have been deemed
illegal.

66

The European Court of Human Rights held that the

French customs searches and seizures proceedings did not
offer sufficient guarantees against administrative

authorities' intrusions. The vagueness of the rules as well
as their gaps violated the principle of proportionality

between the remedies used to enforce law and the
interferences in one's privacy.

4.

Relativity of Individuals Rights

In its decision "Security and Liberty,

67

the

Constitutional Council tried to reconcile individuals'
liberties and the necessities of justice (apprehending the
offenders) as well as the protection of the public order.

The bill controlled by the "Court" and partly validated,

legalized the identity checks and authorized a twenty-four

66

Affaires Cremieux

v. France, Aff. Funke v. France; Aff.
Eur. Ct
H.R. (ser. A) at 256 (1993).
67 See Decision of Jan. 19-20,
1981, (decision "Security and
Liberty") Con. const., Fr
Jan 22, 1981 J.O. 308 (Fr.).

Miaailhe

v.

France,

.

.

,

.
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extension of garde
approval

a vue in

certain cases upon the judge's

68

Before to this statute, police custody was limited to

twenty-four hours, with a twenty-four extension under the

prosecutor's authorization. Therefore, a third period of
detention was added by the challenge provision for certain
offenses. The "Court" held that constitutional principles

such as the protection of the public order encompassing the

apprehension of offenders, persons and goods security, may
authorize state intrusions in one's privacy under the
condition of an intervention of the Judicial Authority,

guardian of individual liberty. According to the
Constitutional Council, the requirements of Article Sixtysix were met.

This constitutional decision shows the relativity of
the role of Judicial Authority as a guardian of individual

liberty. The judges are obliged to apply the law. Therefore,
a law giving broad investigating police powers must be

enforced. The absence of mandatory control by the

Constitutional Council and the prohibition of such a check
by the French courts permits encroachments on individual

68

See Vroom, The Conseil Constitutionnel supra note 55 at 281.
The law dealt with different criminal aspects such as
toughening criminal sanction, accelerating criminal procedure,
facilitating the entry of victims into criminal cases, reducing delays
in various criminal proceedings, giving judges certain powers
belonging to prosecutors and increasing the right to court hearing of
those in detention.
,

(1988).
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rights. Furthermore, a state interest such as public order

may outweigh privacy and security rights.

CHAPTER II: GATHERING OF EVIDENCE BY SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

I.

Judicial control of the police investigation powers

A.

The warrant requirement

Before examining the legality of a warrantless search
or seizure,

a search or a seizure must

have occurred under

the meaning given to those terms by the American courts.
Thus,

69

a governmental invasion of one's reasonable

expectation of privacy is a search. 70 The objective
expectation of privacy is that recognized by the society.
Leaving objects in plain view to be seized does not fit the
reasonableness test. 71 The degree of intrusiveness may also

determine whether a search has taken place. A sniff test by
a dog does not fall within the Fourth Amendment

requirements. 72 Similarly, the reasonable test is used to

confirm the seizure of a person. The seizure of a thing

69

Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32
Santa Clara L. Rev. 737, 742-48 (1992).
70 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
However,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy when a conversation is
wiretapped with the consent of one of the participant (the undercover
agent). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
71 However, the officers must be lawfully present and have
probable cause to believe the items are incriminating.
72 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983).
.
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occurs when there is a "meaningful interference with an

individual's possessory interest in that property." 73

1.

A principle in the United States

The text of the Fourth Amendment does not itself

require either warrant or probable cause to search and seize
evidence. However,

the U.S. Supreme Court has held its

preference for a warrant requirement. 74 A warrant must be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate upon probable
cause. Thus, an attorney general does not have the character
of a neutral and detached magistrate.

75

There is an immense body of law concerning probable
cause, defined as sufficient information to support a

reasonable belief that evidence of an offense is present in
a particular place or that a person committed an offense.

The intrusion in one's privacy must be justified at its

inception as well as its scope. 76 The particularity

requirement implies a precise suspicion for searching a

particular spot or seizing a specific person. General
searches and seizures are prohibited. The search of a stolen
car in an upstairs bedroom exceeds the scope of the

73

74

75
76

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
See supra note 31.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
See Galloway, supra note 69, at 768-70.

.

.

.
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interference. 77 Scholars point out that the use of

expressions such as "fair probability" or "substantial
chance" 78 that seizable items will be found or that a person
has committed an offense suggests that a lesser quantum of

information is needed. 79
Probable cause is found under the totality of the
circumstances.

80

The veracity, the reliability of the

the means used to get the information and any

source,

corroboration permit to meet the probable cause requirement.
it has been argued that magistrates approve

However,

automatically the police officer's request presenting
probable cause without making an independent examination.

81

The probable cause standards appear flexible. An anonymous

informant's tip,

82

hearsay from a reliable source 83 or the

officers' experience may support probable cause.

84

77

Id. at 770 citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
("Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may
be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs
bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a

(1982)

suitcase

.

"

)

78

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n. 13 (1983).
79 Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Eclipse of the Fourth Amendment:
Searches and Seizures in the Burger Court, CACJ Forum plO-15 (Jan.Feb. 1990) [hereinafter Galloway, Eclipse]
80 See supra note 78 at 230, 233, 234, 238, 241.
81 See William J. Stunz, Warrant and Fourth Amendment Remedies,
11 VA.L.REV. 881, 881-83 (1991).
82 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
(The "two-pronged"
test previously adopted in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, is replaced
by a more flexible approach under the totality of the circumstances.
The former test required evidence of informant's credibility and
surrounding circumstances showing the basis of the informant's
conclusions. In Gates, the Court relied upon corroboration to support
probable cause.
83 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313
(1957) (The
detailed description of the suspect given by the informant and his
)

.
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A distinction must be drawn between arrest and search.
As a general principle, a warrant is required for a
search,

85

whereas a warrantless seizure of an individual

be lawful if the probable cause standard is satisfied.

may-

86

Nevertheless, under the Payton rule, a warrantless arrest in
the suspect's premises violates the Fourth Amendment

provisions

87
.

The warrant must describe with precision the place to
be searched or the person or things to be seized.

88

Nevertheless, a warrant failing to meet the particularity

standard may be reliable unless this irregularity would have
been discovered by a reasonably well-trained officer.

89

prior accurate tips make his information in this case reliable even
though he did not indicate the basis for his tip.)
84 In comparison, the French Cour de cassation refused to
consider that an anonymous telephone call provided sufficient basis to
invoke flagrancy and therefore to legalize body and premises searches
of the persons suspected of using drugs. It held that an external sign
(indice apparent) is a prerequisite to characterize flagrancy and
therefore, to conduct a search without the consent of the suspect. See
Judgment of Feb. 2, 1988, Cass. crim.
(Diaz), 1988 Bull. Crim.
No.
In this case, the Cour de cassation maintains its
52, at 142-45 (Fr.)
position vis-a-vis the conditions of flagrancy.
85 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)
("The
general rule [is] that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable "
86 See United Sates v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)
87 See Payton v. United States, 445 U.S. 573, 573 (1980)
("The
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant.").
88 U.S. Const, amend. IV providing that "[N]o Warrants shall be
issued, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
89 See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)
.

,

,

.

.

)

.

.

.
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Some scholars relying upon foreign criminal procedures

support a warrant requirement limited to searches of
buildings' structures or curtilage.

2.

90

An exception in France: The formal judicial investigatory

The French law enforcers conducting searches or

seizures are not required to act under a warrant except once
a formal judicial investigation is conducted within an

instruction.

91

The investigating judge

(j'uge d

'

instruction)

may proceed to any act necessary to the manifestation of the
truth 92 that are gathered into a dossier. He will decide

whether there is sufficient cause to remand a defendant to
trial.

93

Even though competent to investigate,

the examining

judge usually delegates his powers to the judicial police

officers under a written order called a rogatory commission
(commission rogatoire)

.

The Criminal Procedure Code admits

those delegations of powers when the investigating judge

cannot conduct himself the investigation. They are routinely
90 See Craig M. Bradley, The Courts "Two Model" approach to the
Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429, 444

(1993)

.

91

See supra note 12. We have stressed the existence of the
prosecutor's supervision of the police acting in a flagrancy inquiry
as well as in a preliminary one. The law officers inform the
prosecutor of their investigating researches by sending him reports
[proces verbal). The investigating search or seizure does not need to
be judicially approved. Thus, the initiative to conduct a search or
seizure belongs to the police officers' discretion.
See C. Pr. Pen. art. 81 al 1 (Fr.).
One of the interests of the instruction relies on the
examining judge's power to place the suspect under a preventive
92
93

detention

.
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given. This substitution of competences does not concern

certain acts reserved exclusively to the juge d instruction
'

such as searches in a lawyer's or doctor's office or in a

press enterprise.

94

An instruction is mandatory only for

felonies (crimes). Therefore,

the judicial supervision over

police officers is rather limited because more than 90% of
all the offenses are not preceded by an instruction.

95

An author has pointed out the lack of legal discussion
in France about information necessary to provide a

sufficient basis for the magistrate's belief.

96

The warrant

provides the nature of the offense investigated that is the
object of the prosecution.

97

A rogatory commission may be

general and may encompass any investigatory act. There is no

need to indicate the name of the suspect and his address.
However,

98

such a generality concerning the offenses

prosecuted is prohibited. In other words, a warrant

94

See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 56-1 al 1,2; 56-2 (Fr.). Similarly,
once there is an instruction, suspects can no longer be interrogated
by the police, see C. Pr Pen. art 152 al 2 (Fr.).
95 Moreover, the practice of "correctionalization" undermines
this judicial supervision. In this situation, the suspect is charged
with a lesser offense, a delit, to avoid a criminal jury trial before
the Cour d' Assises only French court composed with a jury. Therefore,
this practice permits the defendant to be tried only by professional
judges before the tribunal correctionnel In France, the initial
jurisdiction of criminal matters belongs to three categories of
courts: the Tribunal de police (least serious offenses), the Tribunal
correctionnel (middle-range offenses), the Cour d'assises (felonies).
96 See Tomlinson, The French Experience, supra note
3, at 184.

,

.

85.
97

See C. Pr. Pen.
See C. Pr. Pen.
searches are permissible
found" and may be useful
98

art. 151, 152 (Fr.).
art. 94 (Fr.) (This article holds that
in places where seizable objects "may be
to the manifestation of the truth.)

.
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concerning a group of offenses without determining them will
be held illegal."

B.

Execution of the written order

1

The staleness rule

.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Fed.
P.

41(c) (1))

R.

Crim.

require the search warrant's execution within

ten days, whereas the arrest warrant is not bound by such a
rule. Moreover, probable cause must exist until the time of

execution. The underlying rationale of this rule is the

possibility that probable cause becomes stale. Generally,
the warrant search or seizure must be executed only during

daytime (from

9

a.m.

to 10 p.m.)

.

However,

the magistrate

may extend its execution under the condition to justify his
decision. Furthermore, a daytime search that continues into
the night may be held valid.

100

There is no French equivalent to the staleness rule.
the French investigating judge sets time limit for

However,

the rogatory commissions' transmission to his office.

Otherwise,

the judicial police officers have a delay of

eight days after the execution of warrant to send their

99

No.

278
100

See Judgment of Mar.

1957,

Cass, crim.,

1957 Bull. Crim.,

See United States v. Burgard,

551 F.2d 190

(CA8 Mo.

(Fr.

21,

)

1977).
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reports.

101

Similarly, a daytime search or seizure is

required under the French Code for the three inquiries

previously mentioned (from

6

a.m.

to

9

p.m.)

exceptions of drugs and pandering offenses.

2.

102

with the

103

Discretion of the police officers

The American police officers' discretion such as the

means used, the degree of coercion required, governs the

warrant's execution. Nevertheless, the basic Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement must be satisfied. This
standard has been "stretched" by the U.S Supreme Court in
the "drug courier profiles" cases.

104

Under a search warrant, the police officers can seize

incriminating items, contraband, instruments of the offense
such as burglary tools and, mere evidence of criminal

activity (Fed.

R.

Crim.

P.41(b)).

The general delegation under the French warrant permits
the judicial police officers to decide to search a

particular place, to initiate a dwelling search. However,
dwelling searches require the person whom the premises are
searched to be present. If she is not available, she names
someone to represent her. In case of impossibility, the
101

See C. Pr. Pen. art. 151 al 4 (Fr.).
See c> Pr P £ n art 59 (pr.).
103 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 706-30, 706-37
(Fr.).
104 See Galloway, Eclipse, supra note
79, at 15 citing United
States v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1989).
102

_

_

_

.
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judicial police officer chooses two witnesses except
persons' subject to his authority.

105

Moreover, all the

investigatory acts are reported in proces verbaux signed by
the police officer himself as well as the persons witnessing
106

the operations.

An issue arises when the police officers,

while searching evidence of the offense listed in the
warrant,

find incriminating items that are not related with

this particular offense. The Cour de cassation recognizes
the police officers' right to inform the investigating judge

about this evidence.

107

The body searches may also be

conducted under a rogatory commission. Finally, the judicial
police in charge of the warrant's execution are the only
authorities who can look at the documents before seizing
them.

108

The above proceedings limit the French

investigation's powers and guarantee individual liberties.
It has been stressed that the examining judge's

involvement in the investigation and his authority to

delegate powers to the police are foreign proceedings in the

American criminal procedure.

109

Thus,

a magistrate's

participation to a search in an adult bookstore to seize
pornographic items not listed in the warrant was held
105

See c Pr Pen art 57 al 1( 2 (Fr.).
See c> Pr Pen arts 57 a i 3
65 (Fr.). It must be
emphasized that the above formalities concerning dwelling searches
also applied to the preliminary and flagrancy inquiries.
107 See Judgment of Jan. 14,
1992, Cass. crim.
1992
Bull.
Crim.
No. 13
Fr
108 See c
Pr
Pen art 97 al x Fr .). Th e investigating judge
has also the right to examine them before undertaking their seizure.
109 See Frase, supra note
4, at 668.
_

_

_

_

_

106

.

(

,

,

(

.

)

_

_

_

(
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inadmissible. The "neutral and detached magistrate"

requirement was not met.

3

.

110

The "Knock and Notice" requirement

This rule based on Common Law requires the American law

enforcers to state their identity and purpose before

entering into a dwelling. Thus, the individual has the

opportunity to "peacefully surrender his privacy" 111 and to
prevent a violent entry. According to the general view, the
rule serves individual's privacy and the police officers'

mistaken interferences.

112

The U.S. Supreme Court held that

prior notice is "deeply rooted in our heritage." 113 It
applies to arrests' warrants and to warrantless searches.
The Federal statutory provisions related to the announcement

requirement 114 are broadly construed. The phrase "house"
encompasses any building within the curtilage, apartments,
and motel rooms.

110
111

ed.

115

Once the law authorities have announced

See Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
See John Wesley Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 44:2.

(2nd

1991)
112

Id.

113

See Miller v. United States,
18 U.S.C. § 3109 states:

114

357 U.S.

The officer may break open any outer or
of a house, or any part of a house, or
execute search warrant, if, after notice
purpose, he is refused admittance or
liberate himself or a person aiding him
the warrant.
115

See 18 U.S.C. A

§

3109

301,

313

(1958).

inner door or window
anything therein, to
of his authority and
when necessary to
in the execution of

.

.
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their entry, a denial of entry authorizes use of force. For
example,

surrounding circumstances or silence may show a

denial of entry. The notice of authority and purpose rule
does not apply when exigent circumstances exist or if the

person is aware of the offices' purpose and authority.

116

Moreover, some states have adopted "No knock and Notice"

statutes and certain allow "no-knock" warrant in other

jurisdictions even though the state legislature has not

enacted any exception to the notice and purpose
requirement

117

The numerous and broad exceptions to the

"reasonableness," probable cause and warrant requirements

threaten the privacy rights. These exceptions have
"swallowed" the principles protecting the individual

liberties

116

See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v.
848 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988).
117 See Charles Patrick Garcia, The Knock and Announce
Rule: A
New Approach to the Destruction-of -Evidence Exception, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 685, 700 (1993). This article emphasizes that the "war on drugs"
has lead the courts to adopt a "blanket rule" authorizing the law
enforcers to break down premises' doors in narcotics' cases without
any need to state their authority and aim. For a state pattern, see
William W. Daniel, Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 4-16 (1994). The
issuance of a "no-knock" warrant showing the potential danger to the
police and destruction of evidence was approved in one Georgia case.
See Jones v. state, 127 Ga App. 137, 193 S. E. 2d 38 (1972).
Spinelli,

.

"

.
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II.

A narrow or limited approach to judicial supervision

The effects of the "Criminal Procedure Counter

Revolution" clearly appear in the field of searches and
seizures.

118

The Warren Court from 1961 to 19 69 has been said

to be defendant-oriented.

It extended the Due Process

Fundamental Fairness principle.

119

On the contrary,

Burger and Rehnquist Courts have "eclipse

[d]

120

the

the Fourth

Amendment safeguards. In France absence of a general
judicial warrant requirement facilitates the pre-trial

investigatory function to the detriment of citizens' rights.

A.

Consent search

1.

Necessity of a consent in the French preliminary
investigation

Police receive information concerning commission of an

offense either through their own observations or from the
reports of citizens. Then, they initiate a preliminary
inquiry. We have previously stressed the non-coercive aspect

118

See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania
and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss L.J. 223 (1984)
See also
Wasserstrom, Silas J., The Incredible Shrinking of Fourth Amendment,
21 Am. Crim. L Rev
257 (1984)
119 Thus, even though the states did not violate a specific
provision of the Bill of Rights, Due Process concept was violated if
the state's proceedings were fundamentally unfair.
120 See Galloway, Eclipse, supra note 79.
.

.

.

.
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of this police investigation.

121

Therefore,

in a preliminary-

inquiry there is no arrest power with the exception of the

individual going voluntarily to the police station.

Searches and seizures require the written consent of
the person whose domicile is searched.

122

The consent is a

mandatory prerequisite to a search conducted, only during
legal hours except for terrorism offenses,

either by an

officer or an agent of judicial police. The consenting

person mentions in the report his knowledge of his right to
refuse.

123

When one cannot write, the proceedings must show

that he was aware of his right to refuse. Nevertheless,

the

held no consent was required for a

Cour de cassation

surveillance with a pair of binoculars. This surveillance
falls outside the domicile's protection. The U.S Supreme

Court approved an aerial surveillance in California v.

Ciraolo 124 and in Florida v. Riley.

125

According to the Court,

surveillance from an aircraft flying at 1000 or 400 feet did
121

See supra plO of the thesis.
The legal notion of domicile is defined broadly. Thus, any
lived-in place falls within the legal concept. Thus, the Cour de
cassation invalidated a search conducted in a hotel room without the
consent of his occupant by relying on the sanctity of the domicile
protected in Article 226-4 of the new Penal Code. See Judgment of May
1980 Bull. Crim.
No. 165 (Fr.). However,
30, 1980, Cass. crim.
vehicles as well as left-luggage lockers have not been assimilated to
domiciles
123 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 75, 76 (Fr.). The latter states:
122

,

,

Searches, domiciliary visits and seizures of evidence to be
used against the defendant may not be effected without the
express consent of the person on whose property the operation
takes place. (last part omitted)
124

125

476 U.S.
488 U.S.

207,
445,

39 Crl 3106
44 CrL 3079

(1986).
(1986).
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not amount to a search. No reasonable expectation of privacy-

was found. Those two decisions pointed out the absence of
any physical interferences with residents' yard.
Some authors have narrowly interpreted Article Seventysix of the Criminal Procedure Code, requiring an express
consent,

to argue that the prerequisite consent to search

does not bind vehicles searches during a preliminary
inquiry.

126

However,

the courts do not follow this approach.

Similarly, a body search is limited to the consent of the

person unless it is a protective frisk. Therefore, the

problem is to draw a line between body search and protective
frisk.

2.

Evaporation of the probable cause standard as well as the
warrant requirement

a.

Free consent

The consent must be voluntary.

127

The "voluntariness"

standard is appreciated under the totality of circumstances

encompassing the competence, the mental condition of the
person consenting, her knowledge of her right to refuse, her

126

See supra note 123; See also Pierre Chambon, Ouverture du
coffre d'un vehicule dans le cadre d'une enguete preliminaire, 1984
J.C.P II 20213 sous Tribunal correctionnel Toulon, Judgment of Apr.
26,

1983
127

2041,

(Fr.).

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

36 L.Ed. 2d 854

(1973).

412 U.S.

218,

227;

93

S.Ct.

.

.

.

.
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cooperation or resistance, and police coercive conduct.
Similarly,

128

the temporal scope of the consent is examined

under the totality of the circumstances.

129

The prosecution

sustaining a search as consensual has to prove existence of
"by clear and convincing evidence." 130

a consent

b.

Consent by a third party

The wife or husband 131 as well as roommates can agree to
a search of the areas over which they have common

authority.

132

The underlying rationale to the rule relies on

the assumption of risk.

133

Furthermore, a reasonable police

officer's belief of an apparent authority makes the consent
valid.

134

His reasonable mistake of fact in contrast to a

legal one does not void the search.

135

128 See Galloway, supra note 69, at 760.
129 See H. Patrick Furman, The Consent Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 23 Colo. Law. 2105 (1994)
130 However, a preponderance of evidence may be sufficient to
prove a voluntary consent under state-law. See Hall, supra note 109,
at § 8:11. Nonetheless, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 1 (1983), states

the "clear and convincing evidence" test as the general standard.
131 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct.
2022,
29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)
132 Similarly, a parent may consent to his child's
bedroom, an
employer may also consent to a search of an employee's work or his
storage areas. See Generally Hall, supra note 109, at §§ 8: 31-8: 52.
133 See Ronald L. Carlson, Criminal Justice Procedure,
§ 2.2
(4th ed. 1991)
134 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111
L.Ed. 2d 65 (1983)
135 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct.
889, 11
L.Ed. 2d 856 (1964). The Court refused to extend the third party
consent to an officer's mistake as to someone's legal authority.

.

.
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3

.

Dilution of the consent

In both countries,

police can put pressure on the

individuals to obtain a consent. In France, the availability
of a detention up to 24 hours

{la garde a vue)

provides the

police with an effective threat. In the American procedure,
the totality of the circumstances' test permits more easily
to find a voluntary consent. The prosecutor is not required
to prove that the individual was informed of his right to

refuse.

136

The failure to give Fourth Amendment warnings is

irrelevant where the defendant "had been arrested and was in
custody, but his consent was given while on a public street,

not in the confines of the police station." 137 A person who
is not aware of her right to refuse to consent to a search

will not be protected by the constitutional provision if her

consent is found voluntary under other factors. Ones have

argued than uneducated people will be more "willing" to
consent because they are not aware of their right to
refuse

138

136 See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973)
[consenting person has no right to be advised of his right to refuse)
137 See united States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 424 (1976).
138 See Galloway, Eclipse, supra note 79, at 18.

,
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B.

Emergency situations

Exigent circumstances and hot pursuit cases permit

American law enforcers to derogate to the warrant
requirement protecting privacy in one's home and one's
property. Their French counterparts operating in a flagrancy

investigation have broader powers to search and seize
evidence or person than in a preliminary inquiry.

1

.

a.

A broad concept

Flagrancy

The judicial police officers have sometimes

characterized ordinary offenses as flagrant ones to search
and seize an individual without his consent. This issue has

arisen in drug detention and illegal aliens cases. In those
situations, the individual does not present any external

proof of his actual criminal activity. These offenses are

difficult to detect because of their occult aspect.
The construction of the term "flagrant" divides the
scholars. For some of them, a flagrancy situation is that

which appears to the individual

'

s

senses

.

Other rely more

precisely on objective signs 139 whereas other ones assimilate

139 See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953 (Isnard case), Cass. crim.
1953 J.C.P. II 7456 rapport Brouchot (Fr.).

.

.

.

.
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flagrancy offenses with emergency situations. Finally,

another view grounded on Article Fifty-three of the Criminal
Procedure Code holds that there is flagrancy when the
offense is actually committed without any need to see it.

140

The French case-law requires objective signs that an offense
has occurred and is still "flagrant" 141 The reports filled by
the police must indicate that those signs were present. The

jurisprudence of Cour de Cassation has held that a flagrancy
inquiry must follow a flagrant offense and not the opposite.
The problem is to determine what constitutes objectives'
signs of flagrancy. Thus, a tip from an anonymous informant
is not a sufficient basis to characterize an external sign 142

in contrast to the victim's testimony.

143

Nevertheless, an

apparent clue of a flagrant offense makes its seizure by a
judicial police agent valid.

144

Moreover, a person's change

of walking direction at the sight of the police officers is

sufficient to open a flagrancy inquiry.

145

Furthermore, the

140 See Mer i e et vitu, Traite de Droit Criminel,
(4th ed. 1989)
See also Judgment of May 30, 1980, Cass. crim.
1980 Bull. Crim. No.
165 at 411, 1981 D.P. Jurisprudence 533 note Wilfrid Jeandidier (Fr.).
141 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 53 (Fr.): "The felony or delict that is
in the process of being committed or which has just been committed is
a flagrant felony or flagrant delict." See also Judgment of Jan. 4,
1982, Cass, crim., 1982 Bull. Crim., No. 2 (Fr.).
142 See Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass, crim., 1982 D.P. 642
,

(Fr.

)

.

143

301

No.

See Judgment of Oct.
(Fr.

144

8,

1985,

Cass, crim.,

1985 Bull. Crim.

)

See Judgment of March 2, 1993, Cass, crim., 1993 Bull.
93 (Fr.) (The judicial police agents seized a weapon from a
damaged vehicle involved in a death accident. They noticed it while
they were removing the vehicle.)
145 See Judgment of Jan. 4, 1982, Cass, crim., 1982 Bull. Crim.

Crim., No.

No.

2

(Fr.

)

.

.

.

.

.
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victim's testimony of a future offense (bribe) was held
relevant to characterize an appearance of the criminal
activity. One author has wondered how the Court could rely
on an appearance sign of an offense not yet occurred.
the Trignol case,

146

In

the Cour de cassation validated a vehicle

search without requiring an external proof and even though
the search occurred several days after the commission of the

offense (kidnapping)

147
.

One may wonder whether the "end

justifies the means."

b.

Exigency situations

The exigent circumstances 148 under American case law

constitute a growing area since 1925.
threat of loss of evidence,
officers,

151

150

149

They encompass the

physical danger to police

to third parties and even to suspects,

danger of

146

See Judgment of Apr. 22, 1992, Cass. crim.
1995 D. Jur 59
note Haritimi Matsopoulou (Fr.
147 Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, Cass, crim., 1980 J.C.P. I No.
2983 (Fr.). The critics of this case focused on the Court's
interpretation of flagrancy. Article 56 of the criminal procedure Code
holds that searches and seizures concern the persons suspected to be
engaged in a criminal activity. Here none suspicion existed against
Mr. Trignol who was one of numerous citizens searched. Therefore, the
French Court relied on an extensive notion of flagrancy.
148 See Generally Hall, supra note 111, at § 7
149 See Carroll v. United states, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53. The
mobility of the automobile creates an emergency allowing a warrantless
search because the driver could flee the locality.
150 See W ong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441,
,

.

)

407 (1963)
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct
1868 (1968) (A reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed during a
street encounter creates exigent circumstances justifying a frisk on
less than probable cause)
83

S.

Ct.
151
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escape, hot pursuit,

152

and the automobile exception. The

courts also focus on the amount of time necessary to obtain
a

warrant and on the gravity of the underlying offense.

153

Most of the American exigent situations are flagrant.
Nevertheless, this exception to the warrant requirement also

applies to offenses that are no longer "flagrant" such as an

entry based on a recent tip in an old case.

2.

Broad investigative police powers

a.

Body search

154

The French law enforcers acting in a flagrancy

situation do not need a prior judicial authorization to an
individual's search assimilated to a perquisition.

155

Moreover, no daytime rule applies but the body search must
be conducted by a police officer with the same sex of the

person frisked.

156

Originally, under the American case Terry v. Ohio, the
law enforcers could search a suspect and seize dangerous
items such as weapons to protect them. This protective frisk

152

See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18
L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967)
153 See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80
L.Ed. 2d 732 (1984) (The Court held the entry in defendant's home to
arrest him for a traffic-violation illegal).
154 See Frase, supra note 4, at 579.
155 See supra note 46.
156 See Picard, supra note 37.
.

.

.
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was limited to the outer of the clothes. The search may not
go beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is

armed.

157

the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the

However,

scope of the frisk to places 158 and drug detention. Thus, a

pat down and a strip search of a person suspected of hiding
drugs in her alimentary canal was held valid.

b.

159

Premises or buildings search

The inviolability of a private area such as the

suspect's home is set aside when exigent circumstances exist
under American case-law. Thus, a warrantless entry in one's

home 160 or a warrantless entry of a third person's premises 161
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The "Knock and

Announcement" requirement does not apply. In Segura v.

United States,

162

the Court held that the police did not

violate the Fourth Amendment when after a warrantless entry
in the suspect's home,

they remained inside for several

157 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993)
(An
officer while patting down a suspect prolonged his frisk to identify
an object even though he knew it was not weapon.)
158 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (The passenger
compartment of the individual stopped may be searched even though the
suspect has stepped out of his vehicle.)
159 See united States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985) (The defendant was detained 16 hours without any judicial
authorization. However, this detention was not deemed unreasonable.).
160 See pa t on v. New York, 445 U.S. 73, 100 S.Ct. 1471, 63
y

L.Ed. 2d 639 (1980)
161 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct.
1642,
68 L.Ed. 2d 38 (1981)
162 See segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104
S.Ct. 380, 82
L.Ed. 2d 599 (1984)
.

.

.

.
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hours, while the suspect was in custody. The seizures were

not deemed unreasonable despite the absence of a threat of

destruction.
The French police, searching in a domicile, must

respect the proceedings previously described.

163

The Criminal

Procedure Code authorizes domicile search of all persons

having participated in the offense or having incriminating
evidence.

164

The police officers only seize the documents

necessary to their investigation. They can undertake
searches and seizures at any time within "places frequented

by the public when it has been established that persons

engaged in prostitution are habitually received here." 165
Similarly, searches of places where drugs are used in
community,
rule.

fabricated or stocked are no bound by the daytime

166

In both countries,

the law enforcers may search the

scene of a flagrant crime 167 or the homicide scene without a

warrant 168 and seize incriminating evidence.

163

See supra notes 105, 106.
See C. Pr. Pen. art. 56 (Fr.).
165 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 706-35 (Fr.).
166 See c
pr
P £n
art> 706-28 (Fr.).
167 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 54 (Fr.). Moreover,
the French law
officers acting in a flagrancy inquiry can designate experts to
conduct scientific examination (C. Pr Pen. art. 60), can detain
persons on the scene (C. Pr Pen. art. 61), can summon and interrogate
any person holding information about the case (C. Pr Pen. art 62) and
can place witnesses and suspects in investigatory detention (C. Pr
Pen. art. 63
(Fr.
168 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978)
164

_

_

.

.

.

)

)

.
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C.

Vehicle motor searches: A lesser expectation of privacy

1.

"Erosion" of the Fourth Amendment Guarantees

In this area,

the traditional holding that "searches

conducted without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions" seems meaningless.

a.

169

Emergency justification for a search

First,

states,

170

the U.S. Supreme Court in Carroll v. United

held that the mobility of the vehicle created

exigent circumstances, e.g., threat of destruction of
evidence, authorizing a warrantless search.

171

However,

probable cause to believe that there was incriminating
evidence had to be demonstrated. The holding was limited to
immediate search.

172

169

This holding is found in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
341, 357 (1967); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825
(1982); see also California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
See Lisa K. Coleman, California v. Acevedo: The Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches, 22 Men. St. U.
L. Rev. 831 (1992)
(The author stresses the "great departure from the
warrant requirement" in Acevedo.) [hereinafter Coleman, Erosion of the
Fourth Amendment]
170

267 U.S. 132 (1925)
id. at 149, 153.
172 Id. at 134, 36.
171

.
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Then,
v.

the automobile exception was extended in Chambers

Maroney 173 to warrantless searches conducted once there

was no more emergency. The occupants of the car had been

taken to the police station. Nevertheless, exigent

circumstances had to be present at the time of the seizure.

b.

Privacy expectation in containers within the vehicle

Primarily, the Court in United States v. Chadwick,

refused to apply the vehicle's exception to a search of a
footlocker within the automobile.

174

Probable cause to the

containers alone was deemed insufficient.
a

175

Therefore,

such

warrantless search of property was unreasonable because of

no fear of loss of evidence. The second step was to allow a

warrantless search of containers when there was probable
cause to the entire vehicle. In United States v. Ross,

176

the

Court made a complex distinction between probable cause to

search an automobile and probable cause to search a

container only. In the first situation, the privacy

expectation in any containers "yield
[an automobile]

[ed]

to the authority of

search." 177 On the contrary, a warrant was

required in the second hypothetical. It was pointed out that

173

399 U.S. 42 (1970)
433 U.S. 1 (1977)
175 Id. at 13.
176 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
177 Id. at 823.

.

174

.
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police officers could rely on false probable cause to the
whole vehicle to search it.
Finally,

178

the trend toward the weakening of the Fourth

Amendment appeared clearly in California v. Acevedo.

179

The

Court abolished the ambiguous distinction made in Ross

between probable cause to search an automobile and probable
cause to search a container only. A warrantless search of
the containers based only on probable cause to those

containers is lawful.

180

The Court's reasoning is grounded on

the inefficiency of the Chadwick rule. This later "provided

only minimal protection for privacy" and had "impeded

effective law enforcement." 181 One can doubt of the greater

privacy protection provided under the new holding because of
the creation of one more exception to the warrant

requirement.

182

The doctrine stressed the absence of

identification of any factors making the search reasonable
such as the mobility of the vehicle or a threat of loss of
evidence. Even though those justifications were not present,
the reasonableness standard was satisfied.

In the area of

vehicles' searches, the interests of law enforcement

undermine the individual's privacy.

178
179

Wayne R. Lafave, Criminal Procedure § 3.7 (c) (1987)
See Coleman, Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, supra note

169.
180
181

182

169.

Id at 1991.
Id at 1988-91.
See Coleman, Erosion of the Fourth Amendment,

supra note

.
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2.

French courts' refusal to extent the domicile's

protection to vehicles

The Cour de cassation as well as the Conseil

constitutionnel refuse to include vehicles in the legal

notion of domicile except for the vehicles used as premises
(mobile home).

183

Therefore, the protection afforded to

private places does not apply to vehicles. One may wonder
why a lesser expectation of privacy governs vehicles search.
The law enforcers acting within an administrative mission
are not allowed to search vehicles except specialized agents

such as customs personnel. On the contrary, such searches

during flagrancy inquiries are lawful if the conditions of
flagrancy are met.

184

The French Constitutional Council in its decision of

January

12,

1977,

invalidated a law expanding the power of

police to search automobiles.

185

The challenged bill required

neither the commission of an offense nor a threat to public
safety to conduct vehicle searches. The vehicle had only to
be on a road open to traffic and the driver had to be

present during the search. The general search investigatory
powers provided in the bill were deemed unconstitutional.
183

See Judgment of Sept. 11, 1933, Cass. crim.
1933 Bull.
Crim. No. 267; Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979 (Trignol case), Cass, crim.,
1979 J.C.P. II 19337 (Fr.
184 rpj^g
j ur i S p ru dence of the Cour de cassation stresses that a
speed limit violation punished by a contravention even though
flagrante does not authorize a vehicle search.
185 Decision of Jan. 12, 1977, Con. const., J.O. Jan. 13, 1977
,

)

(Fr.

)

.

.

.
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the Constitutional Council did not declare all

However,

searches of automobiles unconstitutional. Therefore,

individual liberty may be set aside when an offense or a
threat to public order is characterized. This decision has

extended the notion of individual liberty.
In the Trignol case,

186

an individual refused to open his

trunk. He was prosecuted under Article L4 of the Highway
Code.

187

Mr.

Trignol relied on the Constitutional Council's

decision to argue the unconstitutionality of the search.
Despite the decision of the Constitutional Council, the Cour
de cassation held the search valid by relying on a different

statute (art. L4)

.

The Court grounded the legality of the

search by "stretching" the concept of

f lagrancy

188

Moreover,

Article L4 was broadly construed to encompass not only

highway safety verifications but also judicial investigation
searches

189
.

186 The no tions of

surety (the searches would have taken place

on a public way) and inviolability of domicile (the vehicle is not a
domicile) were not concerned.
187 This article requires a motorist to
submit to all police
verifications concerning the condition of his vehicle.
188 See supra note 147
189 See Vroom, The Conseil C ons t i tut ionnel
supra note 55, at
186-89.
,

CHAPTER III: INVESTIGATORY RESTRAINTS ON THE RIGHT OF

LOCOMOTION

I

.

Investigatory stops

A.

Requirement of a reasonable suspicion

1.

Abandonment of the probable cause requirement

In the leading case Terry v. Ohio,

190

a stop and frisk

by a police officer was held constitutionally permissible on

reasonable suspicion grounds. It was a great change in the
Court position toward warrantless arrests not based upon

probable cause. Several men attracted the attention of a
police officer. This later approached them for questioning,
and frisked them. The detective patted Terry's breast pocket
and felt a weapon which was then seized. The U.S Supreme
Court held that "specific and articulate facts which taken

together with rational inferences from those facts,

reasonably warrant" the intrusion. 191 However, the intrusion
was limited in scope and purpose. Thus,

the frisk of the

outer clothing was allowed only to locate weapons to protect
190
191

392 U.S. 1
Id. at 21.

(1968)
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police officers. Moreover, the police officers' experience
must have lead them to conclude that a criminal activity may
be afoot.

192

Suspicion alone such as association with known

criminals cannot justify an investigatory stop.

193

It has been point out that the post Terry cases require

less and less evidence to stop and frisk someone.

194

The

problem is that more and more investigatory stops look like
arrests. From now on, an individual may be accosted by a law

enforcer,

stopped on reasonable suspicion or arrested on

probable cause.

2

.

a.

Controversial identity checks in France

Political issue

The French legislator collections the statutes in this
area.

Each time a new legislative majority is elected,

it

will enact a new law about identity checks. In 1981 the law

"Security and Liberty" regulated the identity checks by the
judicial police acting within an administrative mission.
Thus,

a prevention of a breach of the public order

authorizes such identity checks. Even though these

administrative identity checks conducted the judicial police

192

Id. at 27.
See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
194 David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion:
When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659 (1994)
193

"
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by were not allowed before 1981,
conducted.

195

they were routinely

The statute's provisions on identity checks

were challenged before the Constitutional Council on two
grounds: violation of individual liberty and separation of

powers inherent in giving to the judicial police functions

normally within the field of the administrative police. The
Constitutional Council did not really take position on the

constitutionality of an identity control outside any
offense. The restrictions on the individuals' rights were

outweigh by superior interests. Moreover, the guarantees

providing by the law were deemed sufficiently protective of
the individuals' rights. The Constitutional Council held
"[i]t is up to the judicial and administrative authorities
to see to the respect of those rules and guarantees provided

for by the legislator, as well as to the competent courts to

censure and reprimand, should the situation arise, any

illegalities committed.
In 1983,

196

a new statute stated that preventive identity

checks could be conducted in determined places where the

195 rp^g

identity checks were theoretically allowed only in three
"flagrant" delict, traffic's violations and during an
administrative mission conducted by the gendarmes However, the Cour
de cassation held that a preventive (administrative) identity check by
the judicial police was lawful. See Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973 (Friedel
case), Cass. crim.
1973 Bull. Crim.
No 7 1973 D. Jur 541 note
Roujou de Boubee (Fr.)
See supra note 19. Several complaints relying
on the illegality of a preventive identity check by the judicial
officers were filled in 1980. Then, the police decided to conduct only
repressive identity checks to oblige the Legislature to take position.
196 See Decision of Aug. 27, 1986, Con. const., Fr
1986 J.O.
10439 (Fr.) citing decision "Security and Liberty" of Jan. 19-20,
1981, Con. const., Fr
Jan 22, 1981 J.O. 308 (Fr.).
cases:

.

,

,

.

,

.

.

.
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security of persons and property was "immediately"
threatened. The Cour de cassation considered that an

appellate court's motivation based only on general frequency
of crime in the subway to justify identity control was

insufficient.

197

It was necessary to specify in what way the

security of persons and goods were "immediately" threatened.
The 1983 statute was modified in 1986 to come back to the

previous rules of 1981. It was referred to the

Constitutional Council which found the suppression of the
term "immediate" to be consistent with the Constitution.
Finally,

the recent criminal procedure reform of 1993 has

once again modified the prior rules in a more restrictive

way as regard to individuals' rights.

b.

Situations of restraint of the right of locomotion

Under the actual Criminal Procedure Code, a person may
be asked to justify her identity when the police act within
a judicial

(repressive) mission either during a preliminary

inquiry or during a flagrant investigation.

197

198

Even though

See Judgment of Oct. 4, 1984 (Kande case), Cass.
Crim., No. 287, 1985 J.C.P. II 2039 note J. Buisson (Fr.).
198 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-2 al 1
(Fr.):

crim.

,

1984 Bull

The Officers of the judicial police [part omitted] may invite
to justify his identity by any means, any person in regard to
whom there exists an indication causing it to be presumed:
that he has committed or attempted to commit an offense;
or that he is preparing to commit a felony or a delict;
or that he is likely to furnish information useful to an
inquiry in the case of a felony or a delict;

.

.
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the identity card is not mandatory in France,

the document

showed by the person must be sufficiently reliable.
this judicial identity control which has not been

Therefore,

reformed in 1993 is based on an individualized suspicion.
The police officers conducting an administrative

identity controls, e.g., to prevent a breach of the public
order,

199

have been required by the Cour de cassation to

indicate why the security of persons and property were
threatened.

200

The Cour went further, and held that the

prevention of a breach of the public order must be directly
related to the person's behavior whose identity is
201

controlled.

Thus,

in this 1992 case,

the 1986 version of

the identity checks provisions had been read in conformity

with both, the respect of the individuals' rights, and the
Court's jurisprudence.

202

However,

the Court's requirement

went beyond the terms of the Code. The Court's holding made
the distinction between judicial police mission and

administrative police mission more difficult to draw.

or that he
authority.

is

the object

of

a

search ordered by a judicial

199

See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-2 al 3 (Fr.)
See Judgment of May 27,1992, Paris Chambre d accusation,
1992 Droit Penal [Dr. penal] No. 216 (Fr.).
201 See Judgment of Nov. 10, 1992, Cass. crim.
1993 Dr. penal,
No. 23 (Fr.)
The Court stressed that the law enforcers cannot simply
ground the identity control on the facts that two persons were
speaking in a foreign language in an area of high incidence of
larcenies
202 See Judgment of Oct. 4, 1984 (Kande case), Cass, crim.,
1984
Bull. Crim., No. 287 (Fr.). See supra note 197.
200

'

,

.
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Nevertheless, the 1993 legislation has reduced the
scope of this case law by creating a new situation of

identity check: the requested control.

203

This identity check

is executed under the prosecutor's requisition to

investigate in specific places some offenses during a
limited period of time. The prosecutor must identify these

breaches of law. This control, without any particularity
requirement,

is only based on the frequency of certain

offenses in a determinate area. The liberty of movement of
any individual is directly threatened.
The foreigners may be asked to prove their identity

under the above rules. Moreover, their conditions of stay in
France can be controlled. The jurisprudence held that such a

check must not be grounded on proper characteristics of the

person whose identity is controlled such as her skin's
color. Objective sign of alien status resulting from

"exterior circumstances" to the foreigner are required.
The phrase

"

204

circonstances exterieures" may encompass either

203

See c Pr P £ n art 78 _2 a i 2 (Fr.).
see Judgment of Apr. 25, 1985 (Vuckovic and Bogdan cases),
Cass. crim.
1985 Bull. Crim.
No. 159 (Fr.). The issue in those cases
was to know whether a statute relating to foreigners' police (decret
March 18, 1946) had been abolished by the 1983 provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. This statute makes applicable the Ordonnance
of Nov. 2, 1945 requiring the foreigners to be able to present their
immigration papers at any time. The Court held that when there were
external signs of alien status, such as a foreign driver's license,
the control could be based on the decret. On the contrary when those
circumstances were not present, the identity control was bound by the
Code's provisions.
_

_

_

204

,

,

.
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a

physical feature or a physical sign and other

characteristics such as clothes.

205

B.

Enlargement of police powers

1.

Expansion of investigatory stop and frisk

a.

Weakness of the reasonable suspicion standard

The only fact that an individual was observed in an
area of "high incidence of drug traffic" was held

insufficient to justify a stop. 206 However, the trend has
changed,

and the liberty of movement has been restricted.

From now on, an individual walking in a high crime area with
an "evasive" conduct may be stopped and frisked.

207

The

targets of those stops will be the disadvantaged American

minorities
The totality of the circumstances test permits the

courts to appreciate the legality of a stop. The police

officers experience or common sense is a determinative
parameter. 208 A comparison of the suspect with a "criminal

205

See Jeandidier, 1985 J.C.P. II 20465 (Fr.).
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47-49 (1979). In this case, the
individual was stopped in an alley associated with drug trafficking, and he
refused to identify himself before being frisked. A Texas statute
criminalized the refusal to identify oneself.
207 See Harris, supra note 194.
208 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). See also
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 282 (1985)
206

.
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profile" outside of the context of any particular case may

satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.

209

An individual

turning and walking in other direction after having left a

house known for cocaine traffic may be stopped. The

reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry is met.

210

Similarly, an anonymous tip but corroborated justifies a
stop.

211

Finally, a Terry stop of persons suspected of past

crimes when police have reasonable suspicion that the

individuals they encounter were involved in or were wanted
for a completed felony is constitutional.

212

The individualized suspicion requirement is set aside

when "highway sobriety checkpoints" are conducted by police
who stop every car and question the driver.

b.

213

Stop or arrest?

An individual is seized when he cannot reasonably

believe that he is free to leave.

214

The Court stressed that

an individual can walk away when questioned by the police.

215

Approaching an individual in the street and asking him
209

See Harris, supra note 194.
See State v. Dickerson, 481 NW2d 840, 51 CrL 1021 (Minn.
Sup. Ct. 1992)
211 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); See also Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
The tip must give indication of the
informant's basis of knowledge.
212 See united States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
213 See Michigan Dep t of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481
210

.

'

(1990)

.

214

215

See united States v. Mendenhall,
Id. at 544.

446 U.S.

544

(1980).

,

.
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questions does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
provisions.

216

Thus,

questioning factory's employees about

their citizenship while other agents stationed near exits
does not constitute a seizure. 217 Nonetheless,

the U.S.

Supreme Court, relying on the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment,

invalidated a California Statute

requiring persons who loiter or wander to provide a
"credible and reliable" identification and to account of
their presence.

218

In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan

argued that under the Fourth Amendment, the police officers
acting within a Terry stop may ask investigative questions
"[b]ut they may not compel an answer, and they must allow
the person to leave after a reasonably brief period of time"

unless they have acquired probable cause to arrest him.

219

The degree of force use to interfere in one's right of

locomotion may determine if one is facing a stop or an
arrest.

In Michigan v. Chesternut

220

the Court held that the

police chase of a suspect, who was discarding packets of

contraband while he was fleeing, was not a seizure. The
Court pointed out that no siren, no flash lights or weapons

were displayed. The degree of force used to characterize an
216

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 497 (1983).
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, (1983). The failure to
was contemplated by the "credible and reliable"
identification requirement violated Due Process Clause.

See
See
218 See
clarify what
217

219
220

id. at 366.
486 U.S. 567

(1988). In this case, the flight from the
police alone was deemed sufficient to meet the suspicious grounds

test

64

arrest seems to be particularly high. Thus, the stop is not

converted into an arrest when a gun point or a weapon is
displayed, when one is frisked while facing a wall or lying

down and handcuffed.

221

Similarly, a "hard take down" of

suspects do not turn stop into arrest.

222

In those

situations, the suspect can hardly believe to be free to

walk away. Moreover, the reasonableness requirement under
the Terry doctrine seems far away. The "permissible reasons
for a stop and search and the permissible scope of the

intrusion have expanded beyond their original contours." 223
The use or display of force in making a stop is generally

justifies by the threatening surrounding circumstances.
Furthermore, the police are not obliged to use less

intrusive means yet available to ensure their safety. The

underlying rationale of this rule is the necessity for the
law enforcers to decide quickly which means are the more

appropriate to protect themselves.

c.

Extensive search and seizure and narrow rights

221 See United States v. Lane, 909 F.
2d 895 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Harrington, 923 F. 2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1991) /United
States v. Saffeels, 981 F. 2d 1560 (10th Cir. 1992).
222
223

See Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 537 A. 2d 235 (1988).
See united States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193 at 1198

(1990;

.
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A search warrant for contraband implicitly carries with
it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the

premise. Therefore, the Fourth amendment is not violated. 224

The scope of the frisk have been expanded to the

passenger compartment of a vehicle where a weapon might be
hidden although the suspect was handcuffed. 225 The area of
control doctrine of Chimel v. California 226 is determined by
the potentiality of harm not by actual, physical control by

the suspect. 227 Similarly, airport search cases have extended

Terry to allow investigative detention of things. 228
The period of time of a seizure is also an essential
issue. The surrounding circumstances of cases will determine

whether the duration of the investigative detention was
reasonable.

229

The courts rely on the diligence of the police

officer to resolve the matter.
Finally, persons subjected to an ordinary traffic stop

are not entitled to Miranda rights 230 because those stops are
not deemed excessively intrusive.

224

See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 411 (1981)
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
226 395 U.S. 752 (1969)

.

225

.

.

Place,

227

Id.

228

See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v.
696 (1983). Terry doctrine also applies for mailed

462 U.S.

packages
229

See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding
the constitutionality of 20 minutes stop as well as 30 minutes
detention.) See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In
this case, the Court invalidated the detention of a traveler's luggage
for 90 minutes and recommending a maximum of 20 minutes.
230 See Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420
(1984).

.
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The "war on drugs" and the high rates of crimes lead
the judicial authorities to broaden the scope of

investigatory stops and to narrow the constitutional
guarantees.

231

Some commentators point out that the cases

reported focus only on individuals charged with an
offense.

232

There is no statistics on the number of

investigatory stops producing no incriminating evidence.

2.

233

Temporary seizure for an identification under French law

The French identification procedure is far more

intrusive than a Terry stop. If the person is unable to

prove her identity or refuse, she can be seized and

conducted to the police station house for a detention up to
four hours to verify her identity.

234

She is only retained

for the time strictly required to establish her identity.

The person is immediately presented to a judicial

police officer who must give her all the means available to
prove her identity. The individual seized has a right to
inform the prosecutor of his situation. He can also notice
any person of his choice. The prosecutor may decide to end

231

It has been said that the "Bill of rights in general and the
Fourth Amendment in particular are profoundly ant i -government
documents." See Anthony G. Amesterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 353 (1974).
232 See supra note 16, at 679.
233 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The Crime Statistics That We
Would Like to See, Zeitgeist pl2
Spring 1992)
234 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-3 (Fr.).
(
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the detention,

to order a medical exam,

and to verify the

legality of the official reports.

Inaccurate information providing by the individual, or
a refusal to cooperate permit the police,

with the

prosecutor's authorization, to take his fingerprints or
photographs. 235 This police power is also available when no
other means would establish one's identity, and is

sanctioned by imprisonment and fine. 236
The police officer is required to mention in the proces

verbaux the reasons of the control as well as the conditions
under which the person has been presented before him and
that the individual was informed of his rights. The duration
of the detention is also indicated in the official reports

presented for the signature of the person seized.
The above procedural requirements offer certain

guarantees to the individuals' rights. Moreover, the

Constitutional Council relying on Article Sixty-six of the

Constitution has held that the judiciary and administrative
authorities are competent to prevent abuses of the rules

previously described. This holding implies that an action
grounded on an unlawful identity check must be brought
before the courts. Furthermore, the provisions of Article

235 Id. In comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution does not prevent a brief
detention of an individual on less than probable cause to get his
fingerprints where .the detention was authorized by a judge. See Hayes
v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
236 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-4 (Fr.).
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78-3 of the Code are imposed upon pain of nullity. However,

this sanction will be effective if all the subsequent

procedure is nullified and not only the official reports.
Nonetheless, some commentators wonder about the conformity
of this temporary seizure with the European Convention for

the Protection of Human Rights in its Article Five dealing

with arbitrary detentions. 237

II.

Longer restraint on personal liberty

We will discuss the "arrest power" under American caselaw without getting into details. Then, we will focus on the

seizure of an individual up to twenty- four hours by the

French police.

A.

"Arrest power"

1

General power to arrest

.

American police have a general power to arrest on
probable cause (usually without a warrant) but no express
power to detain unarrestable person for interrogation. A

prolonged Terry stop becomes an arrest. Thus, probable cause
alone that a felony was committed by the person subject to

237

See Picard,

supra note 37

)

.
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the arrest is sufficient to arrest the person.

238

On the

contrary, an arrest for a misdemeanor occurring out of the

officer's presence must be grounded on a warrant.

239

A

warrantless arrest implies that probable cause exists or is

determined promptly. Moreover, an extension of pretrial
detention requires judicial review of probable cause.
Arrest in dwellings require a warrant.

241

240

However,

statements of the arrestee made outside the premises are

admissible at trial when there is probable cause to arrest
him.

242

The police officer informs the person under arrest of
his intention as well as the cause of the arrest. Once a

suspect has been arrested, he must be taken "without

unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate." 243 However, circumstances can allow a brief
delay between arrest and arraignment. A confession resulting
of an undue delay must be excluded under the McNabb-Mallory

rule. Those protections enforce the federal statutory prompt
238

See Wa tson v. United States, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
An arrest warrant is a legal instrument authorizing the
seizure of a person. It is indefinitely valid. The officer does not
need to have the warrant in his possession if he knows about it. See
Fed.R.Crim. P. 4.
240 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
241 See M i nn esota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990)
(It held that
a warrant is necessary to arrest someone in his home even if there is
probable cause to arrest him.
242 See Harris v. New York, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (1990).
243 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The
prompt presentation requirement was codified in Fed.R.Crim. P 5(a).
Under the case-law, voluntary confession obtained between six and 24
hours of the beginning of federal custody are admissible if Miranda
warnings were given. See also 18 U.S.C. 3501 (c) (The "Safe Harbor
Provision"
239

)

.

.
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presentation requirement. They do not apply to state
criminal trials. However, many states have adopted similar

provisions
Finally, under the Ker-Frisbie rule,

244

an unlawful

arrest is not a basis of dismissal of criminal charges.

2

.

Search incident to arrest

The Court has held that a body search following a

permissible arrest is lawful, even though the arrestee was
not suspected to have incriminating evidence.

245

An search is

an incident to arrest 246 if "the formal arrest follow[s]

quickly on the heels" of the search and is sufficiently
justified by facts different from those uncovered by the
search.

247

The arrest with or without a warrant must be valid

and the search has to be on the spot of the arrest. In
meanwhile, courts have upheld delayed searches by relying

either on a police continuing right of search or on the

necessity to inventory the property found on the person
before ceiling her. 248 Nonetheless, an unreasonable intrusion
244 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)
(A U.S. citizen
forcibly removed from a foreign country for trial in Illinois state
court could not challenge his conviction on the ground he was
illegally brought there.); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (no
violation of due process when a state prisoner was kidnapped and
returned for trial)
245 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
246 See Ronald L. Carlson, Criminal Procedure Justice
§ 2.2.1

(4th ed.
247
248

1991)

.

See united states v. Edwards,
See Carlson, supra note 246.

415 U.S.

800

(1974).

;
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into the arrestee's body requires a search warrant.

249

Thus,

a surgical intrusion in the suspect's body was compelled by

the Court "even if likely to produce incriminating

evidence." 250 Some state courts have admitted the results of

blood sample taken on drivers even unconscious. 251 Moreover,
the failure to cooperate in an identification procedure,
e.g.,

refusal to give a blood sample, may be used as

evidence at trial against the accused.
Under the Payton rule,

253

252

an arrest warrant is

necessary for felony arrests within private residences
except exigent circumstances. Moreover, a warrantless search
of a place while the arrestee is in custody is not an

incident to arrest. Similarly, a warrant is required to

search an automobile which was first impounded and later

searched while the driver was under arrest.

3

.

Pretextual arrest
249

See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (The use of
stomach pumping to obtain morphine tablets which had been swallowed by
the suspect so "shock [ed] the conscience" of a "civilized society" as
to violate due process.). Nevertheless, a blood sample taken on an
arrestee does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (The defendant while under a lawful
arrest was forced to give a blood sample while resisting verbally.
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1985) (A scraping of fingernail
producing incriminating evidence is a reasonable search.).
250 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). However, a person
searched at the border (body invasion) does not have the same rights
as U.S. citizens. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
)

531

(1985)

.

251

See State v. Findlay, 145 N.W.2d 650, 653 Iowa 1966).
252 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983)
See also
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (admitting the drunk
driver's answers showing his drunkenness as evidence.).
253 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980)
.

.

.
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An individual may be arrested for minor offenses, e.g.,
traffic violations, to permit the police to search for

evidence related to more serious offenses as to which

probable cause is lacking. There are two different
approaches
First,

the courts could determine whether a reasonable

officer "would have arrested the individual absent unrelated
suspicions." 254 They could also rely on an objective
standard: could the law officers validly have stopped or

arrested the suspect in the absence of the invalid
purpose? 255 The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the objective
test which does not take into account the underlying

motivation of the law enforcers. 256

B.

Detention up to 24 hours: the garde a vue

1.

Initiative of the seizure

The French police officers have a powerful seizure

power called the Garde a vue. It emanated from practice

before being organized in the Criminal Procedure Code. This

police custody is decided by the judicial police officers

254

1988)

See united States v. Guzman,

864 F.2d 1512,

1517

.

255

Id.

256

See united States v. Scopo 19 F.3d 777

(1994).

(CA 10

.
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only with no need of judiciary authorities' approval. The

investigatory detention is available in the preliminary and
flagrancy inquiries 257 with noticeable differences. This

restriction of one's liberty is aimed to obtain confessions.
Therefore, one may fear police abuses (physical exhaustion,

threats or violence)
The prosecutor must be informed of the procedure in the
"best delays." The last 1993 version of the code did not

retain the notice of the prosecutor from the beginning of
the police custody. Some commentators have argued that this

"best delays" requirement was in conformity with the

philosophy of this temporary detention. 258 However, the
Constitutional Council specified that this notification must
occur as soon as possible to protect the suspect's rights.
The Cour de cassation held that police custody did not

violate Article 5.3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights requiring an immediate presentation of the person

seized before the judicial authorities. 259

2

.

Length of the investigatory detention

257

See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 63, 77 (Fr.)
See 1993 J.C.P. Doctrine 3720 (Fr.). This article explains
that an immediate information of the prosecutor would contradict the
power of the police to initiate the proceedings. The magistrate's
control on police custody is a later one.
259 See Judgment of March 10, 1992, Cass. crim.
1992 Bull.
Crim.
No. 105 (Fr.
258

,

,

)

.
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In the flagrancy inquiry,

a suspect as well as a

witness, or a "person capable to furnish information on the
facts or evidence seized" may be detained up to twenty- four

hours. 260 The time period starts when the individual is taken
in for questioning. A twenty-four hours prolongation

requested by police can be authorized by a written order of
the prosecutor except for witnesses' police custody.

However,

261

in practice most prolongation are allowed by

telephone, the police custody's extension concerns only the

persons against whom there are presumptive grounds that they
have committed an offense. Moreover, the presentation of the

individuals before the prosecutor which did not exist before
19 93

is not mandatory.

The urgency rationale of the

flagrancy inquiry may explains this rule.
Under a preliminary investigation, witnesses cannot be
subject to police custody. A prolongation of the police

custody must be based on the "necessities of the inquiry."
Then,

the suspect must be taken before the prosecutor.

Nonetheless, under the new provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Code,

"exceptional circumstances"

(without saying

which) may permit a written authorization of prolongation

without presenting the suspect before the magistrate. The
recent reform did not change the situation of the witnesses
260 Police custody is available for flagrant crimes and delits
punished by imprisonment.
261 The detention of witnesses should not exceed 24 hours and
should only last the time necessary to interview them. See C. Pr Pen.
.

art 63

(Fr.

)

75

heard under rogatories commissions. Thus, they may be

detained up to twenty- four hours. However, a twenty- four
hours' extension requires the taking of the witnesses before
the investigating judge.

262

This detention of an individuals

suspected of no crime is obviously excessive and violates
the European Convention on Human Rights in its Article Five.

For drug traffic and terrorism offenses,

the detention

may last four days with the prolongation included (twentyfour hours plus an extension of twenty- fours hours and a new

expansion of two days).

2.

263

Guarantees against police's abuses

The law enforcers indicate in the proces verbaux
d' audition and in a special register the reasons of the

police custody, the times of the beginning and end of the
detention, and that the notice of the suspect's rights was
given. Similarly,

the duration of the interrogations as well

as the resting periods are also mentioned in those official

reports signed by the suspect. His refusal to sign must be
indicated. 264

Nonetheless, the examining judge may exceptionally authorize
an extension of the police custody without seeing the witnesses. See
C. Pr. Pen. art 154 (Fr.).
263 See C. Pr. Pen. arts 706-29, 706-23 (Fr.).
264 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 63-1,
64, 65 (Fr.).

76

The suspect has a right to a medical exam to avoid
later motions to suppress coercive confessions.

265

The

physician is designated by the judicial police officer or
the prosecutor. The person retained has also a right to

contact certain persons. 266
An important debate took place in France as regards to
the right to counsel during police custody. The socialist

opposition challenged the bill which excluded any legal
assistance for drug traffic and terrorism offenses before
the Constitutional Council.

It held that the right to

counsel is a defense right available at the inquiry stage.

Nevertheless, this right may be subject to different regimes

without violating the principle of equality before law among
citizens. The right to counsel attaches only after twenty

hours of detention or after thirty-six hours for certain
offenses.

267

The distinction drawn by the Constitutional

Council between the existence of the right for any offense
and its different modalities of exercise depending on the

offenses explains why this right does not exist immediately.
On one hand we the investigation stage and on the other hand
the instruction and trial stages where the defense rights

fully applied. Thus,

the spirit of the French criminal

procedure would command this late legal assistance.

265 See C.
See c
267 See C.

art. 63-3
art
63 _ 2
Pr. Pen. art. 63-4
268 See supra note 258.

266

_

Pr.

Pen.

Pr

P£n

_

_

(Fr.)
(Fr.)
(Fr.)

268

.
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The counsel can meet the person in garde a vue during

only thirty minutes and he has no access to police files.
The lawyer is nonetheless informed of the charges under

which the person is retained. In fact, his role is limited
to control the proceedings

3

.

Sanction against arbitrary detentions

In theory,

police abuses may be punished by fine and

imprisonment penalties.

269

In practice,

these sanctions are

never used. Disciplinary punishments also exist as well as
civil penalties. Thus,

in this latter case,

the garde a vue

may be nullified only if the establishment of the truth has
been prevented because of an irregularity in the
proceedings. The judges will try to determine whether the

breach of law has had an important impact on the confession.
Thus,

the gravity of the violation seems secondary if it did

not taint the confession.

269

See C. Pr.

Pen.

arts 432-4, 432-5

(Fr.)

.

CHAPTER IV: THE JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

I.

Exclusion of evidence illegally searched and seized

The American exclusionary rule appears unique and does
not have a French equivalent. Therefore,

the scholars point

out that American law provides suspects greater protection

than the French criminal procedure. However,

the result

appears similar in both countries: the courts are reluctant

either to exclude improper incriminating evidence in the

United States or to nullify the procedure in France.

A.

Right not to be tried on inadmissible evidence

1.

Deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule

The exclusionary rule stated in Mapp v. Ohio,

270

bars

the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search
or seizure. The jury will not hear about the fruits of an

unreasonable search. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
Fourth Amendment and deterred the police from violating it.
Similarly, evidence deriving from incriminating items

illegally searched must be excluded under the "fruit of the
270

367 U.S.

643

(1961)

78

.

79

poisonous tree" doctrine. 271 The problem raised by this rule
is the exclusion of evidence which is often

convict a criminal defendant. Then,

necessary to

it is argued that the

"guilty" person will go free.

The Fourth Amendment itself does not provide such a
sanction. It is a judicially created remedy. However,

it is

argued that the exclusionary rule has a constitutional
origin and an effective deterrent purpose.

272

Some scholars

indicate that the exclusionary rule frees criminal suspects
in very few cases.

273

Therefore,

this enforcement of the

Fourth Amendment does not hinder the efficiency of the

American criminal system. In the meantime, the restrictive
application of the exclusionary doctrine may explain its
limited impact on acquittals or dismissal of cases. There is
a much more powerful argument against the claim that the

rule frees criminals. The protection against arbitrary

intrusions commands that police respect the Constitution. 274

271 In comparison,

the Cour de cassation quashed a conviction
resulting from an illegal seizure. An unfruitful investigation had
been closed. However, a police officer seized one of the suspect and
conducted a search. The suspect confessed his participation in a
criminal activity and was convicted. See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953
(Isnard case), Cass. crim.
1953 J.C.P. II 7456 rapport Brouchot
,

(Fr.

)

.

272

See Malcom R. Wilkey & Stephen H. Sachs, Readings in the
Philosophy of Law, A debate on the Exclusionary rule, 261 (2nd ed.
1994) [hereinafter Wilkey & Sachs, A debate]. This latter author cites
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), to emphasize the
"constitutional necessity of effectively enforcing the Fourth
Amendment
273

274

Id.
Id.

at 269.

.
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The guarantee of personal liberty may have a price, e.g.,

exclude vital evidence,

to

in a free and democratic society.

There are repeated denunciations of the rule on

different grounds. The costs of the exclusionary rule have
been listed such as police perjury, excessive burden on the
courts through the motions to suppress evidence, and

performance by the judiciary of the executive branch's job
of disciplining law enforcers.

275

Today,

there are proposals

before Congress revising the new Crime Bill to abolish the

exclusionary rule. 276

2.

Nullity of the procedure

There is no so-called exclusionary rule in French law.

Evidence illegally obtained may still be included in the
case file. However, the finders of fact must have a "deep

seated conviction"

(intime conviction) of guilt before

announcing their verdict. In other words, a conviction based
on illegal evidence will be annulled if the remaining

evidence leaves a real question of doubt on the defendant's
guilt

275

Id. at 263. Appellate judge Wilkey describes till 12 costs
of the exclusionary rule.
276 H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess
(1995); H.R.Res. 61, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
.
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The action taken by the authorities can be nullified if
the provisions of the law have been violated.

277

The issue of

nullification is raised during the pretrial hearing in the
indictment division (chambre d' accusation)

for felonies and

during trial for misdemeanors. The striking of the tainted
part of a case does not cover the preliminary inquiry before
or instead of the judicial investigation.

278

The

investigating judge, the prosecutor, and since 1993 the
parties can bring an action to declare the searches and
seizures null before the chambre d' accusation 219 but only

during the instruction.

280

The ordinance closing the

instruction purges definitively all the irregularities.

A relevant distinction exists between "textual
nullities" and "substantial nullities." The former are

pronounced when a particular provision of the Code enacts
the sanction (nullity) of its violation.

In contrast,

the

annulment of the proceedings is pronounced, even though this

sanction is not foreseen in a text, when infringements on
the defense rights occur (substantial nullities). Thus,

a

substantial nullity is pronounced when the party's interest
have been seriously violated.
277

See judgment of June 24, 1960 (Soc. Frampar Le Monde case)
Conseil d'Etat, Long, Weil & Braibant, Grands Arrets de la
Jurisprudence Administrative (Fr.).
278 It is important to remember that suspect's rights fully
attach when the person is formally charged, at which time the formal
instruction begins.
279 The indictment division is also competent to pronounce
disciplinary sanctions (temporary suspension or decertification)
toward police officers' misconduct.
280 C. Pr. Pen. arts. 170-174 (Fr.).

82

Under the Criminal Procedure Code,

281

the rules

regulating the perquisitions and the identity checks are
sanctioned through "textual nullities." Under a police
custody (garde a vue)
rights,

,

the notice to the detainee of his

the medical exam, and the right to counsel are

substantial formalities. Those safeguards are a benefit to
the defense rights, and their violation requires the

annulment of the proceedings. On the contrary, the mere
formalities requirements such as the mentions in the
official reports about the detainee's notification of his
rights are not substantial. Therefore, the showing of the

accomplishment of those administrative formalities is
sufficient to prevent the invalidation of the proceedings.
Similarly,

the provisions dealing with dwelling searches

during a flagrancy investigation are sanctioned by a
"textual nullity." 282

B.

Focus on police efficiency

1.

More flexibility to police

The scope of the exclusionary has been restricted and
the exceptions broadened. Thus,

incriminating evidence from

an unlawful search will not be excluded when a police

281
282

See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 171, 802
See C. Pr. Pen. art. 59 (Fr.).

(Fr

.
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officer reasonably believes that his search warrant was
proper. This good faith exception to the exclusionary rule

was shaped in United States v. Leon.

relies on a cost-benefit analysis:

283

Its justification

"The marginal or

nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence

obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a

subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the
substantial cost of exclusion." 284 The rationale of the
"reliance exception" is the absence of deterrence. An

officer acting in good faith will not be deterred by the
threat to exclude illegally obtained evidence.

285

It has been

argued that the good faith exception promotes "police
ignorance" of law. 286 The House has passed a bill extending
the good faith exception to warrantless searches. This

concept has been discussed in Senate. 287
The states are free to interpret their search and

seizure provisions. This construction may be broader than
the U.S.

Supreme Court Fourth Amendment's interpretation. 288

some of them refuse to adopt a good faith exception to

Thus,

the federal exclusionary rule. They hold that such an
283

468 U.S.

284

Id.

897

(1984)

.

285 -phis exception was extended in Illinois v. Krull, 107 U.S.
1160 (1987), when an officer reasonably relied on a statute later
found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding, the Court
extended it in Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
286 See Yale Kamisar, Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, Crim. L.
Bull. 15 (1979)
287 H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.Res. 61, 104th
Cong.
1st Sess. (1995)
288 See Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283
(1982).
,

.

"

.
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exception is incompatible with the guarantees of State

Constitution provisions against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

They rely on the deterrent effect of the

289

judicial remedy to exclude evidence as well as the

prohibition for the state to benefit from its error. 290
Derivative fruits of the violation such as plain view
or inevitable discovery can be introduced if they have an

independent source. 291 Moreover, the attenuation of the
causal link between the illegality and the fruits makes the

evidence admissible.

292

It is the so called purged taint

limitation rule. Similarly, admissions of guilt obtained
outside a dwelling despite an unlawful entry in one's home
are usable at trial.

293

Nevertheless, some states case-law

reject the U.S. Supreme Court approach. They consider that

289

See Gary v state, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); State v.
Guzman, State v. Evans, 866 P. 2d 869 (Ariz SupCt. 1994) (holding that
the exclusionary rule is properly made on the basis of an erroneous
computer record); 122 IDAHO 981 (1992); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d
553 (NC SupCt. 1998)
290 The Supreme Court of Idaho has held: "As the state is only
deprived of what it was not entitled to possess in the first place, to
say the Fourth Amendment exacts a cost to the state is like saying
that a thief pays for committing a theft when he is required to return
what he stole
291 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471-74 (1980).
292 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,491 (1963). The
Supreme Court deemed that the defendant's voluntary confession
attenuated the connection between his illegal arrest and the
subsequently statement.
293 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). The Court held
"where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the
exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by
the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken
after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton."
_

.

.

.
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the "per se rule in Harris" affords insufficient protection

constitution.

to citizens' privacy rights under states'

294

Illegally seized evidence (obtained in violation of

Miranda warnings) can be used to impeach the defendant's
trial testimony. 295 The U.S. Supreme Court extended the

impeachment exception from impeachment of direct testimony 296
to impeachment of cross-examination testimony.

297

However,

the Court specified the impeachment exception remains

limited to the defendant's own testimony.

298

Finally,

illegally obtained evidence may be produced to obtain a

Grand Jury indictment. 299 The formal rules of evidence do not
apply during the Grand Jury proceedings

2

.

Reluctance of the French courts to exclude illegal
evidence

In the Trignol case previously cited,

300

the French

police officers investigating a kidnapping stopped many
vehicles to search them. Mr. Trignol refused to open his
294 See State v. Geisler, 25 CONN. 672, 610 A. 2d 1225 (1992).
The State court held that the Harris rule "does not grant to
Connecticut citizens the scope of exclusion that we believe is
necessary to deter police from entering a home without a warrant."
295 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
296 See W alder v. United states, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
297 See united States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
298 See James v
Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990). An Illinois
statute extending the exception to all defense witnesses was held
unconstitutional
299 See United states v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
300 See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, Cass. crim.
1979 J.C.P. II
19337 (Fr.). See supra p53-54.
.

.

,
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trunk,

and was arrested. Before court, he claimed that the

search was unconstitutional relying on the decision of

January 12, 1977 of the Constitutional Council.

301

However,

the Cour de cassation refused to admit the binding effect of
the Constitutional Council's decision. The Cour de cassation

implicitly upheld the Tribunal correctionnel reasoning. The

Constitutional Council only invalidated general and random
searches where the police were not investigating a

particular offense. According to the Court, the law
enforcers were searching vehicles within a flagrancy
inquiry.

302

Therefore, the Constitutional Council's decision

was held not applicable and Mr. Trignol was convicted of

refusing to submit to a vehicle search.
The Cour de cassation is reluctant to conclude that the

non respect of a particular formality has prejudiced the
rights of defense (substantial nullity). Thus, the detention
of a suspect during two more days after the legal period of

the police custody {garde a vue) was not held fundamentally

prejudicial to the suspect. A prejudice in a statutory

violation when the person's right to defend himself against
charges has not yet attached will not be found easily. 303

301 See supra note 185.
302

In this case, the concept of flagrancy was broaden to a non
suspicious situation (the vehicles were automatically stopped) and to
a search taking place several days after the kidnapping.
303 See Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, Cass. crim.
1980 D.Jur. 104
,

(Fr.

)

.
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II.

A.

Protections against police abuses

Alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule

The exclusionary rule is the subject of an important

debate in the United States. It is sometime argued that the
absence of such a rule in other civilized countries

demonstrates the irrationality of the remedy.
For some scholars,

it is not a "constitutional

necessity but a method to enforce the Fourth Amendment." 304
Therefore, other remedies may guarantee the individuals'

rights as well. Thus, the constitutional protection could be

enforced through civil tort action.

305

According to the

general view, a victim of an unlawful detention must prove

both a confinement against his will and an illegal one to
recover for false imprisonment. The citizens victims of
illegal searches may also sue the law authorities under the

doctrine of respondent superior.

306

The tort remedy should

not substitute the exclusionary rule but enhance it through

compensation of innocent victims of government misconduct.

307

Other views suggest the efficiency of disciplinary
sanctions, mini-trial of the overzealous officer separate

304

See wilkey & Sachs, A debate supra note 272, at 2 62.
See Carlson, supra note 133 at §§ 10.15 (2), 10.18.
306 See Herman v. state, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1974). A couple
recovered damages ($14,000) for an early morning "no-knock" search in
the wrong place.
307 See W ilkey & Sachs, A debate, supra note
272, at 272.
305
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from the main criminal trial or decertification of police

officers to enforce the Fourth Amendment guarantees.

B.

308

Role of the French Constitutional Council

Since 1971, the movement of "constitutionalization" of

criminal law offers better protection against government

arbitrary interferences. The Constitutional Council relies
on Article Sixty-six of the Constitution to require a prompt

control of the judicial authority when encroachments on

individual liberties are authorized under a statute. The

intervention of the judiciary seems to be a prerequisite to

valid a bill under the constitutional check.
In 1983 a bill authorizing agents of the tax

administration to search and seize without any judicial
supervision was challenged before the Constitutional
Council. The Constitutional Council balanced the need to

control fiscal fraud against the principle of inviolability
of the domicile.

It held the bill unconstitutional because

the judicial authority did not intervene in the

proceedings.

309

Thus,

the detection of fraud must comply with

308 See Goldman and Puro, Decertification of Police: An
Alternative to Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct 15 Hastings
,

Const. L. Q. 45 (1987)
309 See Decision of Dec, 29, 1983, Cons, const. (Fr.). The
decision referred to different constitutional principles encompassed
in the "bloc de constitutionnalite"
Article 13 of the Declaration of
the Rights of Man providing equal contributions from all the citizens
and the right of privacy consecrated by the decision of January 12,
1977.
.

:

,

.
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the principle of individual freedom also protected by the

Constitution. The Constitutional Council has maintained its

position in its following decisions. 310
The constitutional norms as construed by the

Constitutional Council have been followed by the Cour de
Cassation, particularly in the Bogdane and Vuckovic cases,
the Court overruled its own case-law. The issue concerned
the distinction between administrative and judicial police,

and the challenge of administrative identity checks before
the judicial courts.

311

The Avocat General (Attorney-General

who insures a proper application and a uniform

interpretation of the law) relied upon the Constitutional
Council's holdings to emphasize the duty of the judicial

authority to protect individual liberty wherever it is
threatened. The Constitutional Council had consacred the

jurisdiction of the judicial courts although the traditional

administrative tribunals' competence to control the
operations of administrative police. Thus, since 1985 it is

310 See Decision of Jan. 19, 1988, Con. const., Fr
(The search
and seizure powers given to the agents of the "Commissions des
Operations Boursieres" without any judicial control were held
unconstitutional); Decision of Dec. 27, 1990, Con. const., Fr
(same
holding in this decision related to the agents of the communication
agency); Decision of Jan. 12, 1977, Con. const., Fr
1978 D. Jur 173
(unconstitutionality of a law giving the police unrestricted authority
in vehicle searches); Decision of Jan. 18, 1995, Con. const., Fr
supra note 59
311 Under Article 66 of the Constitution, the judicial authority
is guardian of individual liberty. Article 136 of the Criminal
Procedure Code states that "in all cases of threats to individual
liberty, the conflict [of competencies] can never be raised by the
administrative authority, and the judicial courts always have
exclusive jurisdiction."
.

.

.

,

.

.

.
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said that the Constitutional Council has become the highest
court of the land.

C.

European safeguards

The enforcement of the European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of

November

4,

1950, provides an efficient protection against

government's abuses.

It obliges the contracting states to

312

modify their legislation in conformity with this treaty.
Thus,

the European Court of Human Rights in 1993 held

that the provisions of the French Customs Code (articles 64

and 454)

313

violated Article Eight of the Convention. 314 The

Court examined the scope of the interference,
of the proceedings with the law,

their proportionality.

the accordance

their legitimate aim, and

315

In those three cases,

a numerous number of documents

were seized (till 15,000) among which some were not relevant
to the police inquiry. The searches took place in private

firms and homes. The Court recognized an interference with
312

See supra note 60.
Article 454 allowed customs agents to establish offenses
against the regulations governing financial dealings with foreign
countries through house searches in any place. Article 64 authorized
customs officers to carry out house searches if accompanied by a local
police officer or a judicial police officer during daytime. There were
exceptions to the presence of a police officer while a premises search
was conducted. Those articles are not overridden by the Criminal
Procedure Code
314 Affaires Cremieux v. France,; Aff. Funke v. France; Aff.
Miailhe v. France, Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) at 256 (1993).
315 See Art Eight, supra p22.
313

.
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the applicants' private life and their correspondence. The

petitioners claimed the unconstitutionality of the customs
code provision because houses searches and seizures were not

subject to judicial authorization.

316

However,

the Court held

that Article Eight of the Convention contained no

requirement that dwellings search should be judicially-

authorized in advance. Moreover, it was unnecessary for the
Court to rule on this issue because the interferences were
found incompatible with Article Eight.

The Court also admitted the legitimate aim of the

interferences with the interest of "the economic well-being
of the country and the prevention of crime." The

jurisprudence of the Court has always upheld that "the

contracting states have a certain margin of appreciation in
assessing the need for an interference." Nonetheless, the
exceptions provided in Article Eight must be construed
narrowly. In these cases, the court recognized the

difficulties encountered by the states to prevent flight of
capital and tax evasion. Nevertheless,

the legislation under

examination did not provide "adequate and effective
safeguards against abuses." The exclusive competence of the
customs authorities to assess the expediency, number,
length,

and the scale of inspections as well as the absence

of any judicial warrant requirement were disproportionate
316 The law enacted the Customs Code was not challenged before
the Constitutional Council. Therefore, the regular courts cannot pass
upon the constitutionality of articles 454 and 64.

.
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with the legitimate purpose of the searches and seizures.
The French government was convicted to pay damages, at least
in one case.

In the two other ones,

the Court held that the

judgment afforded the parties sufficient compensation for
it.

The impact of the French government's conviction on the

individual rights' protections should not be neglected

despite the absence of monetary compensation.
The Customs Code provisions on search and seizure have

been modified in 1986 and in 1989 to afford greater

guarantees against arbitrary powers. From now on, a

domiciliary search must be authorized by the President of
the Tribunal de Grande Instance except in a flagrancy case.

Moreover, the searches are limited to certain offenses. The

searches in a home also require the presence of the occupant
or a representing person or at least two witnesses.

Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that those provisions

could be once again challenged before the European
institutions, and the French government could be
317

convicted.

317 See Dominique Viriot-Barrial
La Preuve en Droit Douanier et
la Convention Europeenne des Droits de L' Homme, Rev. sc
crim. 537
(1994) (Fr.
,

.

)
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III.

Conclusion

Striking the proper balance between law enforcement and
individual liberties poses a challenge to any society, and
seems difficult to find. In American case and statutory law,
the issue of probable cause for a search or seizure is the

touchstone of the reasonableness standard under the Fourth
Amendment. The numerous exceptions including consent
searches, exigent circumstances, automobile searches,

investigatory stops, and others have reduced constitutional
protections on liberties. The exclusionary rule does not
apply when the police did not intend to violate the
suspect's rights or act under circumstances where their
ignorance of law is excusable.

French police, when acting in a flagrancy inquiry, may
conduct forcible searches and seizures. They may also hold a

person in custody for up to twenty- fours hours when
detention is necessary for purposes of the inquiry. The noncoercive preliminary inquiry also gives large powers to the
law enforcers. Police custody may be an element of this.

In

both sorts of inquiries, the search of a dwelling requires
the consent of the household. The privacy of one's premises

appears more protected than freedom of movement. Finally,
a judicial

opened,

in

investigation, e.g., once an instruction has been

the rogatories commissions are usually general

concerning the investigative powers delegated to the

.

.
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judicial police officer by the juge d' instruction.

Nonetheless, the police investigation must comply with the

Criminal Procedure Code provisions (such as keeping a

complete record of police action). The defendant's rights
are more protected during a judicial investigation, and

during the trial itself where the rights of defense fully
attach. Even though the indictment division may nullify the

prior proceeding and may return the case to another
investigation,

it rarely happens.

Then,

illegally seized

evidence may be produced at trial

Foreign criminal procedure doctrines are sometimes

pointed out to American authorities to argue in favor of
legal changes. Comparative study is then used as a tool of

law revision. Thus, the absence of exclusionary rule in

other nations, and the general warrant requirement in France

permit some American scholars to denounce the effects of
their own legal rules. We also find the same attitude among

certain French authors
In American criminal procedure,

states have recently

reacted against narrow construction of federal

Constitutional guarantees by the U.S. Supreme Court. This
reaction has been called "the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure." Many states go beyond the Supreme Court's

analysis of the Fourth Amendment to grant broader rights to
their citizens. State courts' judgments resting on adequate

and independent state grounds cannot be reviewed. Thus,

the

.
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"Federal Constitution gives a minimum level of protection
(the floor)

and the states provide larger safeguards

(the

ceiling) against government interference." 318

French political authorities following the general

demand have enlarged law enforcers' powers. The legislature
also intervenes to legalize factual police practices such as

identity checks. The regular judges can never pass upon the

constitutionality of statutes, yet they must apply them. For
this reason,

the role of the Constitutional Council has

evolved and expanded. From a supervision of the separation
of powers between the Executive and the Legislature,

it has

become a guardian of individual liberty. The access of the
individuals to constitutional justice remains an ongoing

debate
An ethical Europe has started to exist through the

enforcement of the Convention of Human Rights. The power of
the contracting states to settle their criminal policy must

comply with the European standards. The nation states may be

compelled to revise their criminal procedure rules. Thus,
France enacted a law in 1991 on wiretapping after having

being convicted by the Court of Human Rights in 1990.
Today,

in France as well as in the United States,

conservative political and judicial authorities aim to

318

Lecture, Professor Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., University of
Georgia School of Law, Criminal Procedure I, October 3, 1994.
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expand the role of law enforcement. Nevertheless, safeguards
do exist and are applied through procedural requirements.
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